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ABSTRACT
The United States has a long-standing tradition of promoting homeownership as the ideal
form of housing tenure. Entrenched in cultural mythology and upheld through legislative
practice, ownership of the single-family home has long been associated with the
"American Dream." As a result, the development and provision of public housing is seen
by many to be an anomaly in a housing delivery system that stresses individual
responsibility and private enterprise. In response, privatization of public housing, the
transfer of ownership rights to low-income residents, is put forth by policymakers as a
means to promote individual responsibility and reduce direct government involvement in
the provision of housing. Debate over these policies has focused on associated costs, the
need to preserve the stock of affordable housing, and the desirability of multi-family public
housing structures as private homes. What is missing from this debate is the voice of the
residents. This thesis attempts to include residents' views by evaluating interviews
conducted at Boston's West Broadway housing development designed to gain a deeper
understanding of their needs and desires. Specifically, it explores whether public housing
homeownership is desirable among residents and the factors that heighten or diminish their
interest. General conclusions drawn from this analysis can be used to promote policy
development that is more reflective of residents' needs.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lawrence Vale
Title: Assistant Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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Introduction
For many Americans, owning a single-family home is synonymous with "having made it" --
with realizing the "American Dream." Homeownership represents success by signaling
financial security and individual perseverance. Historically upheld by legislative practice
as well as by cultural ideology, the desire for homeownership pervades our collective
conscience. For this reason, the institution of public housing does not sit comfortably
within a housing delivery system that emphasizes individual responsibility and private
enterprise.
In response, housing policy, which has traditionally favored the development of the single-
family home, has long wrestled with the need to find some way of making public housing
more compatible with ideological and legislative systems that are uncomfortable with the
public development and provision of housing. Public housing homeownership, the transfer
of ownership rights to public housing residents, is one attempt to transform a public entity
into a private responsibility, thereby accommodating an ethos that stresses individual
action.
While the idea of homeownership for low-income people has gained widespread attention
and even institutional support -- through such vehicles as Fannie Mae, the Federal Home
Loan Banks, and proposed tax credits -- the idea of privatizing public housing in the
United States has remained largely untested. During the Bush administration, however,
with Jack Kemp at the helm of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), public housing homeownership was put forth as a viable policy alternative.
Believing that the provision of assets alone could visibly improve the lives of low-income
residents living in public housing developments, Kemp ushered in programs such as HOPE
(Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere) as a means of transforming
impoverished neighborhoods and public housing developments.
He and other advocates of privatization often cited the following potential outcomes in
promoting and implementing low-income homeownership policies: greater economic
efficiency by reducing bureaucracy and its associated costs, development of a sense of
independence and self-reliance among low-income residents,'an ability accumulate equity
on the part of low-income people, and an increased sense of personal responsibility that
will lead to the improvement and stability of neighborhoods. HOPE legislation promised
similar results. Critics of HOPE and similar programs have pointed to financial costs and
the need to preserve the stock of affordable housing as primary reasons for avoiding such
policies.
While homeownership for the poor may sound good in theory, it is not clear if it is good in
practice for low-income public housing residents. Nor is it clear if it is even desired by
public housing residents. Therefore, in an effort to inform the debate over public housing
homeownership, I use this thesis to explore public housing residents' feelings about their
homes, their neighborhoods, and the idea of homeownership. Using interviews conducted
with residents at Boston's West Broadway public housing development as a research base,
I seek to establish what factors affect residents' interest in ownership. Their responses
can, in turn, help to evaluate the potential success of public housing homeownership
policies.
This thesis adds a new dimension to the debate surrounding the privatization of public
housing by shifting the focus away from policy goals or financial considerations and
toward user opinion. For too long, housing policies have failed to incorporate the voice of
the people they are intended to serve. By using the residents of public housing as the unit
of analysis, I consider their needs, skills, and desires in evaluating whether privatizing
public housing is a viable -- and desirable -- policy.
In evaluating the efficacy of privatization policies from the residents' standpoint, I seek
answers to the following types of questions: What are public housing residents'
aspirations? Is homeownership desired? Does a general desire for homeownership
translate into a desire for public housing homeownership? If not, why not? What are the
qualities -- physical and/or social -- of public housing environments that make ownership
undesirable? Survey results can help to define where homeownership falls in the
continuum of public housing residents' needs and explore the constraints that might limit
its efficacy.
While I use only one case study as a basis for analysis, I believe it is rich enough to
generate some valuable conclusions. West Broadway is a unique case study for several
reasons. First, the site is almost fully modernized, having undergone massive
redevelopment in the 1980s that sought to integrate the development into the surrounding
neighborhood and destigmatize its appearance as a "project." Second, many of the
residents living at the development when the interviews were conducted lived there prior
to redevelopment, allowing the site to be tested as one case over time. Qualitative
differences in the social and physical environments that are observed by long-term
residents can help to highlight which interventions are successful and which are less so.
Third, the tenants, themselves, provide a variety of activities and services through the
West Broadway Task Force.
For these reasons, West Broadway, while not formally targeted for homeownership
conversion, represents "best case" public housing from a physical perspective and, to a
lesser extent, from a service delivery perspective. West Broadway thus provides an ability
to "control" for physical reconstruction considerations, allowing for a more thorough
investigation of other social and physical qualities that may make the development a
desirable place to live and environment for homeownership.
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first, "Ideology and Federal Housing Policy,"
outlines how the ideal of single-family homeownership has come to dominate the United
States' ideological landscape and been reinforced through legislative practice. It also
traces the emergence of public housing and the legislative attempts to transform its
provision in ways that are compatible with private enterprise and an ethos of private
responsibility. The second chapter, "Public Housing Homeownership," explores the
arguments for and against privatization schemes before reviewing some actual
implementation experiences. It concludes by looking at some of the most common
problems associated with these policies.
The third chapter, "West Broadway: Public Housing in Transition," lays out the history of
the development to provide the reader with a sense of place. It pays careful attention to
redevelopment schemes and other measures aimed at integrating the development into the
surrounding neighborhood to illustrate efforts to destigmatize its appearance. The fourth
chapter, "Residents' Views on Homeownership" evaluates sixty interviews with public
housing residents to explore those factors that may be related to an interest in
homeownership. General conclusions are discussed in the fifth and final chapter.
This thesis also contains a number of appendices, including two timelines, basic
demographic data for the West Broadway project, and a methodological appendix that
details how survey information was gathered and analyzed. These pieces have been
separated out from the main body of the text as they provide additional information that is
more descriptive in nature.
The first two chapters are intended to do three things: 1) provide a broad overview of
housing policy and ideology in the United States, 2) describe the various programs that
have tried to reconcile the interests of private enterprise with the reality of publicly owned
housing, and 3) explore, in particular, public housing homeownership policies designed to
expand opportunities for ownership to low-income residents. This cursory review of
policy will illustrate the factors that are considered by policy makers in developing
privatization schemes and assessing their success. What is clear is that while thought is
given to financial, design, management and even equity issues, the opinions of the
residents are noticeably missing. It is against this backdrop of theory and practice that I
wish to explore the actual desirability of homeownership on the part of low-income
residents. Has policy been crafted in ways that reflect the true needs and desires of public
housing residents? While answering this question conclusively is difficult, the fourth and
fifth chapters provide a preliminary set of answers.
Chapter 1: Ideology and Federal Housing Policy
"In America, the form of tenure -- whether a household owns or rents its
place of residence -- is read as a primary social sign, used in categorizing
people, in much the same way that race, income, occupation and education
are." (Perin, 1977)
In this chapter, I explore the ways in which the ideal of homeownership has dominated
America's ideological and legislative systems in terms of housing provision. Specifically, I
address: 1) the cultural and ideological preference for homeownership in the United
States, 2) the ways in which homeownership has been favored by government legislation
since 1930, 3) attempts to expand homeownership opportunities to low and moderate-
income populations, and, finally, 4) the emergence of public housing in the United States,
and the attempts over time to manipulate its production to accommodate a dominant
ideology that supports individual homeownership as the ideal form of tenure. In this way,
I hope to site the issue of public housing homeownership within the broader context of
tenure opportunities in preparation for the following chapter's discussion of recent public
housing privatization efforts in the United States.
A clear understanding of why and how homeownership has come to dominate the
provision of shelter will make clear the ideological boundaries that prevent public housing
from resting comfortably within the United States' dominant housing delivery system.
Moreover, it will illuminate why current public housing redevelopment schemes, such as
the one implemented at West Broadway (discussed in Chapter Three), have placed such a
strong emphasis on tenant "ownership" of space and management responsibilities, if only
in a symbolic sense.
The Ideology of Homeownership in the United States
Much has been written, in both fiction and nonfiction form, about the pursuit of the
"American Dream" -- reaching an economic and social comfort level that is rewarded with
the owning of a single-family home. While it is difficult to determine if demand for
homeownership is innate or manufactured, it is worth reviewing some of the ideological
constructs thought to have fostered the high premium Americans place on
homeownership. In questioning the motivation underlying the desire to own a home,
observers of American social policy have suggested several alternative theories. Briefly,
these include:
* Economic explanations, which attribute motivation to a person's rational,
locational decisions
* Historical explanations, such as modernization or industrialization,
which emphasize a person's desire to live in a place and setting much
different from her work environment
* Psychological/Sociological explanations, which associate desire with
innate human need
* Political Economy explanations, such as Neo-Marxism, which hold the
market economy and an associated need for accumulation in a highly
commodified world responsible for creating "desires"
* Cultural anthropology explanations, which suggest behavior endemic to
Americans, such as the "mythology of landed independence" or "will to
possess" as a rejection of feudal practices (Doucet and Weaver, 1991)
* Political Science explanations, such as the "Manipulated City" (Duncan,
1982), which assign causality to governmental practices that favor -- and
even reward -- a particular kind of behavior. [This last category, which
probes the ways in which policy is created to promote certain societal
objectives, is more carefully explored in the following two sections on
federal housing policy]
Regardless of motivation, be it voluntary or determined, active or passive, structural or
consciousness-based, the desire to be a homeowner has created what Perin refers to as a
culturally recognized "ladder of life." On this ladder, a person transitions upward from
one rung to another, from renter to owner of a townhouse or duplex, to owner of a single
family home. For Perin, "the owners once renters have, in accordance with the American
Dream and the American Creed, negotiated life's hazards and passed through its less
blessed stages toward salvation in a sacred home" (Perin, 1977, p.56).
The desire to be a homeowner permeates our collective conscience. As evidence, a 1992
Fannie Mae National Housing Survey claims that:
Americans place so high a value on owning a home that they will make a
wide range of tradeoffs in order to achieve it. By a three to one margin
they would rather own a home than retire 10 years early; by a four to one
margin they would rather own a home some distance from work than rent
within easy commuting distance; by a four to one margin they would rather
own a home than take a better job in a city in which they could afford only
to rent; and, by a greater than two to one margin, they believe owning a
home is worth taking a second job (Fannie Mae, 1992, p. 2).
What is it about homeownership that is so appealing? Those reasons most frequently cited
in resident surveys include both financial and psychological gains. An ability to
accumulate equity, leave something valuable to future generations, and accrue tax benefits
count among the financial incentives underlying the desire to own a home. From a
psychological standpoint, homeownership bestows a sense of security (i.e., homeowners
are less likely to be displaced than renters), an ability to end dependence on a landlord, and
thus to apply monthly payments toward something tangible and lasting, and a feeling of
great accomplishment. 1 Conservative analysts also claim that homeownership leads to
10ne critic has labeled these attributes "myths," insisting that the so-called national desire to own is
merely a function of dominant ideology (Kemeny, 1981).
increased savings, improved rates of political participation, and a deepened commitment to
caring for one's own property and surrounding neighborhoods (Struyk, 1977).2
On the other hand, some social critics believe that homeownership produces a lack of
mobility due to indebtedness, enhances a sense of social isolation, creates urban sprawl,
contributes to a devaluation of inner cities, and increases travel time to work which, in
turn, increases pollution. On balance, however, for most Americans, these costs do not
outweigh the potential benefits. Indeed, the 1992 Fannie Mae report discovered the
following:
The survey shows that Americans would sacrifice just about anything to
own a home -- it is one of their highest priorities in life. In a world in
which people feel they have little control over events that affect them, they
will make meaningful sacrifices to control a key element of their lives: the
place where they live (Fannie Mae, 1992, p. 9).
The aspiration to own a home is not confined to the economically advantaged. The same
survey reported that, overall, low-income Americans place a higher value on
homeownership than high-income Americans, who may take homeownership for granted;
indeed, "the farther down the income ladder one goes, the more acute is the desire to own
a home" (Fannie Mae, 1992, p. 6). Again, in its use of the word "ladder," the agency
reiterates the notion that success in this country is a vertical process that rewards winners
with a home of one's own. In turn, the procurement of a home brings with it a "bundle of
goods and services" that is more appealing and more rewarding than those associated with
being a renter (as detailed above and suggested by the cartoon on the following page).
2Econometric models and regression analyses, however, have been unable to prove conclusively that
homeownership alone causes these attitudinal and behavioral shifts. Perin describes a survey conducted in
1971 by the National Institute of Mental Health which "found no reason to attribute behavioral changes to
a single source, and preferred to put ownership into a larger context of access to jobs, to credit, to union
membership" (Perin, 1977, p. 62).
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The desire for homeownership extends beyond the need for shelter. The neighborhood in
which one's home is located is as important, if not more important, than the structure
itself. The Fannie Mae survey, for example, found that Americans would rather own a
"bad" house in a "good" neighborhood than vice-versa. Neighborhoods determine
associated services, such as education or police protection. They can also influence how
we assess psychological and financial success; an ability to purchase a house in an
exclusive area represents an ability to reach the top of the housing ladder.
Society reinforces the importance placed on homeownership and location by associating
homeownership with success, a material symbol of "having made it" in society. We, as
members, are pleased to learn that friends have "found the perfect house" or that necessary
financing has been secured for its purchase. It is against this backdrop of desire and
rhetoric that I wish to examine how federal housing policy in the United States has been
crafted and upheld to protect the sanctity of homeownership.
Federal Policy Favoring Homeownership
In 1923, Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, wrote:
Maintaining a high percentage of individual home-owners is one of the
searching tests that now challenge the people of the United States. The
present large proportion of families that own their homes is both the
foundation of a sound economic and social system and a guarantee that our
society will continue to develop rationally as changing conditions demand
(Wright, 1981, p. 193).
And despite the fact that Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt disagreed on almost
everything else, Roosevelt also said, in 1934, "A nation of homeowners is unconquerable."
To some people, the American government, over time, has used the promotion of
homeownership to seek measures that support a volatile construction industry, increase
dependence on governmental lending institutions, and reduce mobility. To others, the
government has helped millions of people realize the "American Dream" by taking
financial risks based on an implicit faith in individuals and their abilities. Hoover's and
Roosevelt's statements can be read to support either contention. On the one hand,
homeownership provides stability and economic security for its immediate recipients and
for the country-at-large. On the other hand, it controls individuals' movement and
imposes responsibilities that require consistently rational behavior and action. Either way,
both views accept government intervention as a given. One writer has even concluded
that "no other country [has] pursued the goal of widespread ownership and owner
occupancy so single-mindedly" (Weiss, 1988).3
The ideal of homeownership has been venerated for more than sixty years through
legislative practice as well as administrative jargon weighted with ideology. (See
Appendix 1-A for a timeline of housing policy). For as long as the federal government has
been involved in it, housing policy has been crafted to reinforce the notion of a "ladder" of
success and to uphold the sanctity of the single-family home. This kind of public support
has resulted in a rate of homeownership that outranks all other industrialized countries.
Given the broad array of federal support for homeownership discussed below,
homeownership rates rose from 44% to 66% between 1940 and 1980 (Joint Center for
Urban Studies, 1985, p.10).
Federal programs that favor investment in owner-occupied homes include 1) the tax code,
which offers a number of benefits to homeowners, 2) government-sponsored capital-
financing institutions that increase the supply of mortgage credit available to potential
homebuyers, and 3) legislation that focuses on expanding homeownership opportunities to
3Other countries that have high homeownership rates include Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.
those who cannot afford to accrue tax benefits or participate in conventional mortgage-
lending activities. 4 Each of these categories merits brief discussion.
First, the federal income tax code provides benefits to homeowners by allowing them to
take deductions for mortgage interest and real estate taxes. Known also as "tax
expenditures" because they represent uncollected taxes, these deductions have provided
nearly $50 billion annually in indirect subsidies to homeowners in recent years. In 1991,
total deductions of this kind resulted in an indirect subsidy to homeowners that was nearly
nine times the size of total federal housing assistance targeted for low-income populations
(Shelterforce, 1992). These institutionalized benefits are not popularly recognized as
"subsidies," however:
Tax deductability and exemptions, as well as the various forms of indirect
subsidy... do not carry the stigma associated with the payments of subsidies
to "public" housing. The importance of this lies in the fact that, if
homeowners can be indirectly subsidized while, say, public housing tenants
can be directly subsidized, it both legitimates homeownership and
stigmatizes non-owners. It therefore readily permits homeowners to be
defined as "paying their way" in housing, as against those who are unable
to do so and must be "supported by the state" (Kemeny, 1981, p. 75).
Since there is currently no limit or cap to the amount that can be deducted, this policy
favors the most affluent homeowners with the largest mortgages. Similarly, capital gains
realized from the sale of homes are deferred if they are reinvested in another home. In this
way, high homeownership rates -- not to mention indebtedness -- are sustained, and the
livelihoods of industries associated with real estate transactions, such as construction and
lending, are protected.
4Supreme Court validation of zoning laws that favor single-family, owner-occupied homes is a fourth type
of federal support.
Over time, the tax code has been used as a "pump-priming" measure as well. In 1975, for
example, when real estate sales were declining, the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 included a
provision that provided a tax credit of 5% (up to $2,000) for the purchase of a new home
(Witte, 1985). In essence, in its attempt to reduce an excess inventory of new housing,
the federal government subsidized a clearance sale of new homes. Although the provision
was repealed one year later, it represents the first time a direct credit to homebuyers was
made available through the federal income tax code.
Second, the supply of mortgage credit, through loans, insurance, and secondary market
operations, has resulted in high rates of homeownership and indebtedness. Beginning in
1932 with the creation of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board System (FHLBB), which
supplied loans to potential homebuyers to stimulate the construction industry during the
Depression, and followed soon after by the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) and
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), government-sponsored financing institutions
have actively supported the ideal of homeownership attainment by guaranteeing low-
interest, long-term mortgages and reducing the risks associated with lending.
The current roster of capital lending institutions, which includes the FHLBB, the FHA, the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Government National Mortgage
Association (Ginnie Mae), produce annual reports that demonstrate why homeownership
is more cost-effective than renting, detail the ways in which owning a home can provide
long-term equity and security, and conduct surveys whose results suggest that
homeownership is the housing form of choice by most Americans. By dispensing service
and ideology, these institutions continue to promote homeownership as the litmus test for
success; their methods are further legitimated by federal endorsement.
Expanding Homeownership Opportunities
While these policies and institutions have allowed many Americans to pursue the
"American Dream" of homeownership, at the same time, access to these institutions has
been restricted or denied to large groups of moderate and low-income Americans.
Mortgage interest deductions, for example, are not significant unless one's initial income is
high enough to realize tax benefits (that is, income must be high enough to allow itemized
deductions). Some government-sponsored financing institutions have income or
employment standards that cannot be met by many people. Other capital-lending
organizations have been known to "red-line" areas or to discriminate against specific
populations by refusing to supply or insure mortgages, often resulting in whole areas
where homeownership rates are low and, conversely, the tenancy rates for renters are
high.
In response, the creation of federal programs aimed at expanding homeownership
opportunities for those populations previously denied the capital needed to buy their own
homes began in the 1960s. Clearly, the intent of these policies, which included the Section
235 program (provision of interest rate subsidies), rehabilitation loans and grants, and the
Urban Homesteading program, was to provide a buy-in to the venerated notion of
homeownership. Consider, for example, former FHA commissioner Phil Brownstein's
explanation of why the Section 235 program was founded:
Not only was this country involved in a war in Vietnam, but it was also
facing internal crisis at home... The opportunity of homeownership for the
poor was thought to be an appropriate response to the fear and unrest
resulting from the riots and near-riots in many of our metropolitan areas.
For those willing and able to accept the responsibility, homeownership was
deemed a worthy aspiration, one which would afford qualified purchasers
the hope and opportunity of entering the mainstream of American life"
(Stegman, 1991, p. 44) (emphasis added).
Even the Kerner Commission on Civil Disorders stressed the need to increase
homeownership opportunities to stabilize the country, as suggested by its conclusion that
"the ambition to own one's home is shared by virtually all Americans, and we believe it is
in the interests of the nation to permit all who share such a goal to realize it" (National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968, p. 261) (emphasis added). Thus, the
goals of such policies seem to have been two-fold; namely, to increase social stability and
security and to offer tangible proof that the American Dream was indeed within reach of
low-income people (with government suggesting that provision of the second goal would
cause the realization of the first).
This notion recalls Perin's assertion that those transitioning from one rung of the tenure
ladder to the next -- those that are in an unsettled state -- are to be feared:
Transition is a universal property of life, marked often by rites of passage.
People traverse social time and social space by leaving one social category
to enter another.... Those considered safe are those who are settled, who
have not changed categories in a while; they are in some taken-for-granted
status. Those on the move, in the process of becoming one thing but not
yet settled into it -- the pregnant woman not yet in the new category of
mother, the traveler out of reach of his social place, or the betrothed who
intends to change categories but has not yet -- their in-between status
makes them dangerous. Transitional, they are endowed with powers,
mysteries, or dangers "disturbing the life of society and the individual."
Rites of passage are intended to reduce their socially harmful effects (Perin,
1977, p. 53).
Homeownership programs targeted at low-income residents, such as Section 235 and
Urban Homesteading, can therefore be seen as attempts by the federal government to
regulate behavior through the wholesale provision of the American Dream.
The Section 235 program was established in 1968 to provide interest rate subsidies to
low-income households. Between 1969 and 1979, the program provided subsidized
mortgages to nearly 529,000 low-income homebuyers; in its first three years alone, it
provided nearly 400,000 loans, which accounted for nearly 10% of all single-family
housing starts (Stegman, 1991, p. 42-44). However, the program was plagued by a
variety of problems. These included: 1) poor construction of new homes, which led to
high maintenance costs; 2) purchase of poorly constructed existing homes which had
received cosmetic work to ready them for purchase 5 ; 3) racial segregation, "red-lining"
and "blockbusting" by limiting options for nonwhite homebuyers to certain areas; 4) FHA
and HUD management scandals 6 ; 5) a lack of counseling to first-time homebuyers; and 6)
the high, long-term subsidy commitment, which could never be fully known as it was
dependent on participants' incomes.
The combination of these problems resulted in large default rates; by 1975, 13% of all
Section 235 properties had titles transferred to the mortgagee and eventually back to
HUD (Helbers, 1980, p. 91). In 1976, the program was revised to target moderate-
income families by imposing higher down-payment requirements, reducing subsidy rates,
and excluding existing housing. The program has since been eliminated. Nevertheless, an
assessment of the Section 235 Program suggests that, while the federal government may
have been committed to expanding homeownership opportunities for low-income
populations, it did not account for the management needs of its intended recipients nor for
the ways in which they could be exploited, due to lack of experience and expertise (as well
as pure greed on the part of the perpetrators). Indeed, for many participants, purchasing a
home led to unanticipated, expensive problems that diminished the sense of "success" they
may have felt about being homeowners.
5One study found that 26% of all Section 235 loans for new houses and 43% of loans on existing houses
were made for either substandard or inhabitable properties (Stegman, 1991, p.45).
6These types of scandals were most notably reported in Cities Destroyed for Cash by Brian Boyer of the
Detroit Free Press, which detailed a number of Section 235 fraud cases.
Finally, the Urban Homesteading program represents a more recent attempt on the part of
the federal government to allow moderate and low-income residents to purchase their own
homes in an effort to revitalize struggling neighborhoods. Begun as a demonstration
program in 1974, it authorizes the purchase of repossessed homes and buildings for a
minimal fee. In return, the new owners are fully responsible for performing and/or
financing rehabilitation costs necessary to bring the buildings to code. Because of the
costs associated with reconstruction, the program has attracted mostly moderate-income
"homesteaders," although some cities have applied for Section 312 loans to augment
limited renovation funds and open participation to low-income residents.
Intended to stabilize and encourage investment in neighborhoods experiencing some level
of decline, the Urban Homesteading program has had mixed results. In some cases, it has
spurred gentrification efforts, which, in turn, have reduced housing affordability for lower-
income residents. Other studies, citing income and owner occupancy levels as determining
variables, conclude that homesteading has had no conclusively positive effects on
surrounding neighborhoods (Varady, 1986).
Problems with the Section 235 and Urban Homesteading Programs
The experiences of both the Section 235 and Urban Homesteading programs highlight
some of the general problems associated with low-income homeownership programs.
These include:
1. Siting: Both programs have been criticized for selling housing located
in unsafe or economically segregated areas to low-income residents. Being
located in such areas reduced the likelihood that homes could be an
appreciating asset.
2. Construction: Many buildings sold through these programs had
serious structural problems, which led to high repair costs. The new, low-
income homebuyers seldom had the necessary funds to cover unforeseen
maintenance costs, causing many of them to default on loans.
3. Displacement: Urban Homesteading efforts sometimes led to
gentrification of previously low-income areas, which resulted in higher
rents and, consequently, the displacement of low-income tenants.
Similarly, those residents who were living in housing targeted for sale
through the Section 235 program who did not want to purchase were often
displaced.
4. Hidden Costs: The subsidy commitments associated with the Section
235 program were much higher than originally anticipated, resulting in the
need to reduce the number of units sold. Similarly, because residents
moving into Urban Homesteading buildings often did not know the full
scale of repairs needed, they often turned to localities for financial
assistance.
5. Demonstrable Effects: One goal of both programs was to increase
security and investment in troubled neighborhoods. By virtue of ownership
alone, policymakers hoped that residents would feel more invested in their
neighborhoods and promote stability. In many cases, this did not happen
or was not easy to gauge.
Based on these observations, then, future low-income homeownership programs must be
designed to ensure that housing targeted for sale is in good condition and located in
healthy neighborhoods, that there is minimal displacement of existing residents, that costs
are acknowledged upfront, and that programs set reasonable goals. These lessons will be
useful in evaluating public housing privatization experiences in the next chapter.
These problems notwithstanding, the federal government's efforts to expand
homeownership opportunities to low-income populations can be seen as attempts to
engender stability in low-income populations and neighborhoods. The goals of these
programs clearly underscore an intent to push low-income residents up the culturally-
mandated ladder of housing tenure to induce security and responsibility. 7
Viewed in this manner, it becomes easier to understand why federal housing policy has
continuously struggled with the concept of public housing and its appropriate place within
the housing delivery system. As public housing has shifted from being transitional to
becoming permanent housing, application of the "ladder of life" metaphor has become
impossible. In response, federal housing policies have attempted to compensate for this
immobility of public housing tenants by transforming public housing developments into
private homes in ways that mimic actual ownership, first by increasing management
responsibilities, second through careful reconstruction designed to desinstitutionalize the
physical environment. Privatization, an actual transfer of ownership, is the clearest way to
transform public housing from a publicly-owned entity to a privately-managed one.
The history of public housing in the United States suggests that this country has never
been comfortable with public development and public ownership of residential space. As
public housing policy has changed over time to stress consumption of private housing over
production of public housing, greater emphasis has been placed on the responsibility of the
individual to find shelter over the commitment of the government to provide shelter.
(Ironically, this shift away from government intervention recalls earlier housing policy
geared toward individual development of the frontier, such as the Homestead Act of
7The desire on the part of government to encourage homeownership among low-income residents has
fluctuated, as evidenced by the following comment made by Carla Hills in 1975, then Secretary of HUD:
"We do not intend to permit the dream of homeownership to end. But we will not mindlessly spark a
massive subsidy of housing production that will defeat the very goals we have set out to accomplish... This
is after all the land where more homes of better quality are owned by a higher percentage of people than
anywhere else in the world. We intend to keep it that way" (quoted in Perin, 1977, p. 78). This
statement underscores the tension between expanding homeownership opportunities and preserving the
culturally-mandated housing ladder.
1863). This shift is representative of a larger need to make all housing policy consistent
with an ideology that favors homeownership and individual action.
The legislative history of public housing over the last sixty years paints a picture of a
country struggling to overcome a contradictory policy of attempting to accommodate
private enterprise while acknowledging the shortcomings of a market economy. As
described below, one response to this dilemma has been to create solutions that remain
supportive of private industry and uphold the venerated status of an owned home.
The Emergence of Public Housing in the United States
As economic conditions during the Depression worsened, more and more Americans faced
evictions and foreclosures on their homes and property, leading to overcrowded and
unsanitary living conditions. Property maintenance was reduced, which caused already
blighted areas to become more deteriorated and previously stable areas to drop in value.
At the same time, construction of new housing dramatically declined, contributing to a
growing unemployment rate in the construction trades. These conditions helped set the
stage for an emerging federal commitment to provide affordable housing and reinvigorate
the private construction industry.
Although the creation of a public housing program was not formally authorized until 1937,
government production of housing targeted for low-income people began in 1932 when
President Hoover passed the Emergency Relief and Construction Act. This legislation
established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to make loans to corporations whose
sole purpose was to create affordable housing structures. Under Roosevelt, these
activities were transferred to the Public Works Administration (PWA), which had been
authorized by the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. In 1934, in an effort to shift
governmental policies from consumption to production in order to stimulate the economy,
the federal government assumed all production responsibilities (Weicher, 1980, p.31).
That same year, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was established as a "pump-
priming" measure to increase housing construction by reducing barriers to
homeownership.
Similarly, the Housing Act of 1937 was designed both to help the economy and to provide
needed housing. Although housing reformers had lobbied for housing legislation on the
basis that it would compensate for the market's failure to provide shelter and reduce
substandard living conditions, a broader-based recognition of the need to stimulate the
construction employment industry made such legislation politically palatable. Even one of
its sponsors, Senator Robert Wagner, was careful to stipulate that public housing would
stimulate private development, not compete with it. In a 1935 speech he stated:
The object of public housing, in a nutshell, is not to invade the field of
home building for the middle class or the well-to-do which has been the
only profitable area for private enterprise in the past. Nor is it even to
exclude private enterprise from major participation in a low-cost housing
program. It is merely to supplement what private industry will do, by
subsidies which will make up the difference between what the poor can
afford to pay and what is necessary to assure decent living quarters (quoted
in Keith, 1973, p. 32).
In other words, Wagner sought to assure the private building industries that public
housing would serve a population that could not possibly compete with their targeted
population, thus preserving the need for single family homes. Nevertheless, private
industry remained adamantly opposed to the idea of public housing, claiming that public
control of residential space was contrary to American values. As the president of the
National Association of Real Estate Boards explained:
Housing should remain a matter of private enterprise and private
ownership. It is contrary to the genius of the American people and the
ideals they have established that government become landlord to its
citizens... There is sound logic in the continuance of the practice under
which those who have initiative and the will to save acquire better living
facilities and yield their former quarters at modest rents to the group below
(quoted in Keith, 1973, p. 33).
This kind of opposition clearly illustrates the private sector's discomfort with policies that
viewed housing as a given right and not as an earned privilege. Despite such resistance,
the Wagner-Steagall Act of 1937 passed and established the United States Housing
Authority (which became the Public Housing Administration in 1947) to oversee the
creation of local public housing authorities that would be responsible for constructing,
owning, and managing new public housing structures. Whereas previous policies had
allowed for direct federal construction, the 1937 Act sought to decentralize the process by
placing construction responsibilities on local authorities, perhaps an initial indication that
the housing delivery system should be as localized, or individualized, as possible.
The 1937 Act had three primary goals: to upgrade the quality of decent housing, to
eliminate one substandard unit for every new unit constructed (referred to as "equivalent
elimination," it ensured a consistent demand for new housing and presumably produced
replacement housing for those who had been in them), and to increase employment
opportunities. A 1938 document published by the United States Housing Authority
clearly demonstrates who was to live in public housing:
[the goal of the program is] to raise the living standards of typical
employed families of very low-income who are independent and self-
supporting, but who have not been able to afford the kind of homes in
which independent and self-supporting Americans should live" (quoted in
Peattie, 1972, p. 2).
Believing that the people who would live in public housing had steady incomes, legislation
authorized the public funding of development costs only for public housing buildings; all
operating and maintenance costs were to be covered by tenant rents and assumed by the
local authorities. The Act authorized construction of 160,000 units over twelve years.
However, as American involvement in World War II increased, construction resources
were retargeted toward war efforts, and housing construction -- of both public and private
stock -- took a backseat to temporary provision of shelter for war workers.
In the late 1940s, recognition of worsening housing conditions, the desire to reduce slum
areas, and the need to create transitional housing for returning war veterans were the
underlying conditions that propelled the creation of new housing legislation. Because the
war had caused pent-up demand for housing on the part of both low and moderate-income
households, one of the primary intents of proposed legislation was to build housing that
could serve as a temporary residence for those people, especially veterans, waiting to
climb the housing ladder. The construction of public housing units was seen as a means of
providing safe and temporary shelter.
The Housing Act of 1949, the Taft-Ellender-Wagner Act, called for "the realization as
soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every
American family," and authorized the construction of 810,000 public housing units over a
six-year period. Six years later, however, only 200,000 units had been built; by 1960, that
number had climbed only to 300,000. Indeed, in 1969, twenty years after the passage of
the Taft-Ellender-Wagner Act, the original goal still had not yet been met (Freedman,
1979).
Fewer units were created than authorized because home builders, real estate agents, and
lending institutions lobbied to oppose any legislation that provided for public production
or ownership of housing. Using the political (and time) gap between authorization and
appropriation, the group funded an advertising campaign that preyed upon people's fears
of increased -- and mismanaged -- taxes. "Can You Afford to Pay Somebody Else's Rent?"
was the slogan of choice, and it was widely used in local elections to discredit those who
supported the public housing legislation. Four Hearst newspapers ran identical editorials
blasting public housing as "socialized housing" (Freedman, p. 67). Indeed, during
Congressional deliberations, one representative had claimed:
... so-called federal low-rent housing are foreign bodies, Communist plants,
in the municipalities where they are located and simulate in a marked
degree cancerous growths in the human organism. The passage of H.R.
4009 will be a capital political victory over the economic life of the nation,
a sweeping advance on the part of the power planners toward their goal of
complete regimentation, Russian style (Journal of Housing, 1949, p. 175).
Again, such attacks on public housing indicate the apprehension many people felt about
direct government involvement in the provision and ownership of shelter. Public housing
was seen as an entitlement, as a practice that undermined the ethos of individual
responsibility and the need to earn certain privileges (like housing). For many,
government intervention that resulted in the regulation and decommodification of a good
previously provided through private industry represented an unwanted step towards
collective responsibility that was antithetical to both the American tradition of independent
action as well as a competitive market economy. Thus, by characterizing public housing
as "socialized housing," opponents sought to highlight how government production of
housing was incompatible with a reigning ideology that favored individual pursuit of
shelter.
At the same time, agencies that built and managed publicly-funded housing had to comply
with federally-sanctioned laws and regulations that were easier to avoid in the private
sector. For example, one of the provisions of the 1949 Act was that Public Housing
Authorities (PHAs) could not discriminate against people receiving public assistance and
had to give priority to those displaced by urban renewal efforts (Rohe and Stegman,
1991). PHAs' operating incomes were dependent on incoming rent, and rent was set at a
percentage of income. As more and more poorer residents moved into public housing,
local housing agencies faced declining rent and maintenance bases. During the next two
decades, as poorer families moved in and the physical conditions deteriorated, public
housing -- intended to be transitional for those working towards homeownership -- rapidly
became permanent housing for America's poor. Often economically and racially
segregated, the areas in which public housing was located received little capital
investment, further compounding the sense of decline.
Moreover, guidelines for siting and design were altered to allow cost-reducing, high-rise
schemes to be implemented. Even some housing reformers supported the notion of high-
density projects. One claimed that such structures would have an "increased chance of
maintaining its distinctive character because its very size helps it to dominate the
neighborhood and discourage regression to slum life" (cited in Wright, 1981, p. 234).
Technology and health codes also contributed to the interest in using standardized housing
prototypes. Many believed that large, uniform structures, which were supposedly more
cost-effective and time-efficient in terms of construction, would allow for easier
implementation and stricter supervision of building and health codes. While development
tasks may have been ameliorated, the social costs of building high-density projects may
not have been thoroughly considered. Despite these design arguments -- and because of
their failure in practice -- public housing soon became stigmatized as "housing of the last
resort." As James Baldwin recalled in Nobody Knows My Name:
The projects in Harlem are hated... The projects are hideous, of course,
there being a law, apparently respected throughout the world, that popular
housing shall be as cheerless as a prison. They are lumped all over Harlem,
colorless, bleak, high, and revolting... Even if the administration of the
projects were not so insanely humiliating (for example: one must report
raises in salary to the management, which will then eat up the profit by
raising one's rent; the management has the right to know who is staying in
your apartment; the management can ask you to leave, at their discretion),
the projects would still be hated because they are an insult to the meanest
intelligence (Baldwin, 1961, p. 60-61).
Indeed, even the 1968 President's Committee on Urban Housing remarked that "for most
of its history, Congressional pressure has required that projects have few amenities. This
has proved to be short-sighted since many projects have been so distinctive in appearance
that they have tended to stigmatize the neighborhoods in which they are located and the
tenants themselves" (President's Committee on Urban Housing, 1968, p. 61).8 In
response, Congress amended previous housing legislation in 1974 to prevent construction
of high-rise public housing projects for families with children unless there was no practical
alternative. Nevertheless, the Commission's statement affirms the belief that housing is
read as a primary indicator of social value, that the kind of housing one lives in determines
one's social worth. Housing developments that are marked as undesirable places bring
with them an associated qualitative judgment of the people who live in them. Once
stigmatized, it may be difficult to create a new sense of identity, as several studies suggest
that how people feel about their housing influences how they feel about themselves. 9
Seen this way, residence in public housing and low self-esteem become self-reinforcing.
Due to the decline of both the image and management of public housing, housing policies
in the 1960s began to stress private/public partnerships in the hope that private enterprise
would reinvigorate the institution of public housing through improved construction.
Again, such policies assumed that matching private resources with public need would
81n the late 1960s and early 1970s, researchers such as Oscar Newman contended that architecture had a
significant effect on the safety of public housing environments. His seminal work, Defensible Space:
Crime Prevention through Urban Design, published in 1973, detailed how buildings should be constructed
to promote safer places.
9Clare Cooper Marcus' article, "Housing as a Symbol of Self," provides a thorough description of the ways
in which the form of shelter affects self-confidence and evaluation of self-worth.
produce housing, provide jobs, and lend private sector expertise. Thus, the Housing Act
of 1965 returned to the issue of production and authorized the construction of public
housing through the Turnkey Program, designed to allow private industry to construct
housing on its own before selling it to local housing authorities. As one HUD official
explained:
... the Turnkey system completely reverses the traditional method of
producing public housing. This "conventional" system followed the pattern
of public construction with its built-in safeguards and its concomitant built-
in delays and expenses. More important ... the system excluded the great
bulk of private entrepreneurs engaged in private construction and thereby
lost the potential benefit of their expertise and efficiency (President's
Committee on Urban Housing, 1968, p. 76).
Between 1965 and 1985, one-third of all new public housing units were funded through
the Turnkey program (Bratt, 1986, p. 342). While construction costs and time may have
been somewhat reduced through this program, the developments were still managed by
PHAs and were seen as stereotypical public housing and thus carried the same stigma as
other publicly constructed projects.
In response, housing policy in the 1970s witnessed a shift away from production of public
units toward a voucher system that placed more "choice" in the user's hand. In 1973,
President Nixon imposed a moratorium on all national housing programs to consolidate
what by that time had become a complex and over-extended housing delivery system.
Believing that an increase in demand for affordable housing was more cost-effective -- and
more socially desirable -- than an increase in construction, programs providing housing
allowances (known also as subsidies or cash grants) began to be implemented on a wide
scale. 10
10Subsidy programs did not begin in the 1970s. The Section 8 program had its roots in the Section 23
program, started in 1965 to help low-income families rent units in privately-owned housing. PHAs
negotiated long-term contracts with private landlords and paid the difference between the market rent and
Proponents of programs such as Section 8 believed that the merits of providing low-
income households with vouchers included an ability for poor residents to escape the
stigma of living in public housing (read: assimilate), and an opportunity to help
"deconcentrate" the poor. Again, the government turned to private industry as a partner
in this endeavor, as suggested by the President's Committee on Urban Housing:
The nation has been slow to realize that private industry in many cases is an
efficient vehicle for achieving social goals... some programs still make too
little use of the talents of private entrepreneurs... One of the basic lessons
of the history of the Federal housing programs seems to be that the
programs which work best... are those that channel the forces of existing
economic institutions into productive areas (President's Committee on
Urban Housing, 1968, p. 54).
Providing vouchers instead of building units can be interpreted in several ways. First, it
can be seen as an attempt to "deinstitutionalize" public housing by moving away from a
reliance on dense, often stigmatized projects and towards an increased reliance on housing
created in the private sector. This suggests that the function of government is not to see
that its citizens are adequately housed at the lowest possible cost but to create conditions
in which private enterprise will produce more housing (Bredemeier, 1950, p. 120).
Second, by shifting responsibility away from government and placing it on individuals, the
voucher system betrays a withdrawal from viewing housing as a "right" or a collective
responsibility and, instead, sees it as a commodity to be sought out by independent
individuals exercising their freedom of choice. In these ways, the voucher system supports
a housing delivery system that is more compatible with a dominant ideology that cherishes
unregulated private markets and individual action. Moreover, this shift from production
to consumption reinforces the notion of a housing ladder by allowing people with
a proportion of the tenant's income. Over 100,000 rental units were financed under this program between
1965 and 1974, when it was superseded by the Section 8 program (Bratt, 1986, p. 341).
vouchers to transition, or "filter up" to better housing, making public housing less
desirable and, in turn, more stigmatized.
Twenty years later, the shift away from the supply side has only been intensified; the rate
of construction of new public housing units continued to decline steadily through the
1970s and 1980s. As the federal deficit continued to grow and cost-cutting measures
were sought out, the creation of new public housing stock became harder to sustain. As
evidence, completions of new public housing units in 1988 were reported to be 45 %
below those in 1980, and starts were 82% lower (Stegman, 1990, p. 338). Between 1981
and 1987, federal authorization for new public housing construction fell from $4 billion to
$400 million (Matulef, 1987, p. 175). One reason for this dramatic decline in new
construction concerns long-term costs. The costs associated with the maintenance and
modernization of existing projects via operating subsidies and capital improvement
expenditures buttress political arguments against new construction and in favor of
alternative policies, like the voucher system, that reduce direct government involvement.
This is not to say that existing public housing developments have been entirely neglected.
In fact, large housing projects became the focus of physical redevelopment interventions in
the 1980s. Responding to studies that suggested that the revitalization of a physical
environment could lead to improved social and economic conditions for poor residents,
local housing authorities began to pursue funding that would allow for comprehensive
reconstruction. 1 1 The most ambitious of these types of redevelopment efforts focused on
"deinstitutionalizing" the physical aspects of public housing through improved amenities,
such as landscaping and circulation patterns, a decrease in density, and increased
assignment of space, such as private entrances and private yards.
11Strategies that focused on the physical revitalization of public housing were implemented in earlier
federal programs, such as Performance Funding System (PFS) and modernization programs funded
through CIAP and MROP.
Sometimes, as physical environments were upgraded, residents were encouraged to
assume management responsibilities in the hope that increased personal responsibility for
maintenance would lead to more stable as well as more harmonious communities. These
strategies can be seen as attempts to reduce direct government provision of services and
induce individual action, giving credibility to the sense that housing was less an entitlement
and more an earned privilege and responsibility.
Whereas housing policies in the 1980s concentrated on physical renewal, the 1990s have
witnessed an increased interest in comprehensive service provision. Recognizing that
physical reconstruction alone may not be enough to transform troubled projects, current
redevelopment strategies often include direct attempts to address the residents' economic
and social needs. Service centers, for example, that provide job training or day care or
youth counseling, are considered essential in order to foster stable, financially viable
communities. Again, tenant involvement -- in the form of management or direct provision
of services -- is strongly encouraged.
Public Housing in the 1990s
Such services are designed to meet residents' specific needs, which have clearly changed as
the resident demographic profile has changed over the last sixty years. In 1992, the
median household income for those living in family public housing developments was
between $5,000 and $7,000; over 40% of those families had at least one family member
receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (Council of Large Public
Housing Authorities (CLPHA), 1992, p. 6). That same year, more than 75% of families
living in public housing reported receiving no income from employment (Vale, 1993, p. 9).
The percentage of single-parent households living in public housing ranged from 65% to
75%, depending on the number of units managed by the local housing authority (CLPHA,
1992, p. 8). Approximately 66% of non-elderly families were headed by single women;
more than 86% of these families had incomes below the poverty line (Vale, 1993, p.4).
Finally, African-Americans accounted for 56% of the overall public housing population,
followed by Whites (32%), Hispanics (8%), Asians (2%), and others (2%) (CLPHA,
1992, p. 11).
Existing public housing stock varies greatly in form and condition. In 1992, there were
estimated to be nearly 4 million people living in approximately 1.4 million units of public
housing in the United States. These units account for nearly 5% of all rental housing and
as much as 15% of all rental units in large cities. Nearly 60% of all public housing stock
was built before 1970; only 11% of the current stock was built after 1980 (CLPHA, 1993,
p.4). Despite the attention that high-rise public housing structures seem to receive, only
27% of public housing stock is high-rise; 32% is garden apartments, 16% is low-rise, and
another 5% is single family homes or townhouses (Stegman, 1991, p.51). Modernization
needs of the nation's public housing stock are great. According to a report prepared by
Abt Associates for HUD, there was a backlog of needs of $21.5 billion dollars in 1987;
according to a 1992 ICF update of the Abt report, that figure now stands at $29.2 billion.
Meanwhile, waiting lists for public housing units continue to grow. In 1987, average
demand outweighed supply by a ratio of 46:1 (that is, 46 households applied for every one
available unit) (Stegman, 1991, p. 51). According to a 1990 report prepared by the
National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO), over one
million households were on waitlists for public housing at the end of 1988, and the waiting
period for a unit ranged from twenty-four years in New York City to eight years in other
East coast cities, although the overall national average was thirteen months (NAHRO,
1990, p. 6).
Despite such high demand, housing policymakers continue to struggle with the need to
accommodate the institution of public housing within a system that is wary of public
ownership of residential space. In a society and market economy that stresses individual
action and freedom of choice, it is difficult to rationalize public intervention. Moreover,
despite the fact that the existence of public housing is due to admitted market failures, the
stigmatization that accompanies living in the projects is difficult to escape, either because
it signifies personal failure of some sort or because the developments themselves are
deemed undesirable places to live and automatically stigmatize their residents. Catherine
Bauer's 1957 comment on public housing continues to ring true:
In the US, public attitudes about social security, collective bargaining and
national economic controls have all followed the classic steps outlined
years ago by George Bernard Shaw: 1) it's impossible; 2) it's against the
Bible; 3) it's too expensive; and 4) we knew it all the time. But public
housing, after more than two decades, still drags along in a kind of limbo,
continuously controversial, not dead but never more than half alive (Bauer,
1957).
Public ownership of a commodity such as housing, therefore, serves as a constant
reminder that the market system is failing the poor. Consequently, policy that guides the
scope of housing services to be provided must reconcile the need to compensate for
allocative inefficiencies with the need to protect market stability.
The Benefits and Costs of Public Housing
In determining appropriate policy, the opportunities and costs associated with public
housing need to be adequately considered. On the positive side, public housing offers the
following opportunities:
* It provides shelter to people who are unable to secure housing on the
private market
* It ensures long-term affordability for low-income people, as it is the
only housing not part of the speculative market
* Services for low-income people can be concentrated to reach a larger
number of intended recipients
* It provides greater legal protection from evictions and arbitrary landlord
actions (Connerly, 1986)
* Minority tenants are more likely to be admitted to public housing than
to private housing (Connerly, 1986)
* Assuming that these projects are decent places to live, public housing can
be seen as a positive reflection of what the federal government is capable
of accomplishing
On the other hand, the problems that continue to plague public housing are similar to
those of the 1950s and 1960s, suggesting to some critics that there are certain inherent
flaws that cannot be remedied. These include:
* Poor construction, which can cause large maintenance costs
* Poor location, which can lead to spatially segregated neighborhoods
* Poor design, which can lead to undesirable, unmanageable, and/or unsafe
living environments
* Poor management, which can cause deteriorated physical and/or social
conditions
* Administrative restrictions (such as no pets or not being allowed to
paint apartments), which can limit residents' sense of control
* Inadequate PHA financial resources, which can also lead to
deteriorated physical and/or social conditions
* High density, which can lead to reduced privacy and provision of
amenities
* Income restrictions, which can cause one of two distinct outcomes:
economically segregated projects or the forced removal of tenants whose
incomes increase beyond allowable limits (although this latter condition is
more easily remedied through statutory change)
* The poor image of public housing, leading some critics to claim that the
institution of public housing is the warehousing of the poor in government-
owned ghettos 12
* These problems have been compounded further in recent years by high
rates of crime and drug use, which can lead to unsafe living environments
and further stigmatize public housing projects 13
In addition, public housing is hindered by its need to accommodate various social goals.
Because it is publicly developed and owned, construction and management processes must
comply with federally-mandated social legislation, including fair wages (Davis-Bacon),
metropolitan planning ordinances, environmental impact standards, equal opportunity
mandates, and public bidding guidelines. Although accommodating these factors may add
significant costs and time delays, public housing is rarely publicly acknowledged for doing
so.
Given these conditions, both positive and negative, public housing as a form of tenure lies
at the low end of the continuum in terms of providing a desirable "bundle of goods and
services." In terms of security, amenity, and neighborhood stability, public housing
developments fall far short of those services associated with the single-family owned
home. Even architect and housing official Henry Whiting claimed in 1957:
The typical publicly subsidized dwelling is deficient in interior space, in
outdoor privacy, and in true American residential character... Families with
12The stigma associated with public housing cannot be overemphasized. As one critic has stated, "Public
housing was not tested and found wanting; it was condemned without trial" (Meehan quoted in Bratt,
1986, p. 355). Others have claimed that public housing projects reinforce a culture of poverty, as the
atmosphere may emphasize a charity stigma.
13For a thorough discussion of drug use, its effects on public housing environments, and strategies to deal
with drug problems, see Langley Keyes' Strategies and Saints: Fighting Drugs in Subsidized Housing
(1992).
children generally want to live in individual homes... A yard, a porch or a
terrace is almost universally desired" (quoted in Bauer, 1957, p. 141).
Indeed, the status of public housing has led one critic to claim that "it would be difficult to
invent a program so antithetical to the American Dream as public housing" (Freedman,
1969, p. 193). The true liability of public housing in the United States is that it is an
ideological, political, technical and cultural misfit. It cannot find a niche in a country
heavily biased toward homeownership. What, then, is an appropriate policy response to
the dilemma of public housing?
One answer, a policy of privatizing public housing -- selling units to tenants as private
homes -- can be seen as an effort to transform public housing into a commodity that has a
place in a market economy. By giving public housing "exchange" value as well as "use"
value, privatization strategies seek to remove public housing from the arena of public
responsibility, instill it with competitive value, and place it in the private sector. In an
attempt to reconcile the tension between private property rights and protection of public
investment, public housing homeownership as a policy directive aims to transfer
permanent responsibility for living conditions to the tenants themselves in the hope that
personal ownership will improve both the neighborhoods and the residents' social and
economic positions. As Eugene Meehan explained in 1979:
Owning the family home is an aspiration almost as firmly entrenched in the
pantheon of American values as free enterprise and the independent family.
Indeed, when homeownership is tried and fails to produce expected results
-- better care of property or more stable family behavior -- the impulse is to
query the training, motives, or competence of the persons involved rather
than question the value of the institution. Such beliefs played an important
part in shaping the original conception of public housing as a way station
between leaving the family in which one was raised and locating one's own
family in an individual home. They also account for the addition of tenant
ownership of housing units to the list of devices expected to privatize and
thus improve the public housing program. The nature of the expectations
associated with homeownership are best reflected in such homilies as
"what's everyone's property is no one's property" and the quite illegitimate
inversion, also widely accepted, that what is someone's property will
automatically be someone's concern and will receive proper treatment
(Meehan, 1979, p. 157).
The Turnkey III program of 1968, Section 5(h), established in 1974, the Public Housing
Homeownership Demonstration of 1985, and the HOPE (Homeownership and
Opportunity for People Everywhere) programs of 1990 can be seen as federal attempts to
transfer homeownership rights and responsibilities to public housing residents in an effort
to move them up the tenure continuum and improve associated services. The next chapter
explores more fully the motivations underlying these programs as well as some of the
outcomes of their implementation.
Chapter 2: Public Housing Homeownership Programs
"Only private property will be maintained, respected, and improved...
Publicly owned property is essentially owned by no one and will always be
abused" (Jack Kemp, 1984).
As I argued in the last chapter, public housing in the United States is incompatible with a
dominant ideology that links individual responsibility with private homeownership. In
response, privatization advocates promote tenant homeownership of public housing as a
mechanism to transfer property maintenance to residents, reduce government involvement
in the provision of shelter, and increase the overall number of American private
homeowners. In this chapter, I examine recent attempts to privatize public housing;
specifically, I review 1) the goals and rhetoric surrounding such programs, 2) the actual
implementation efforts of these policies, and 3) problems associated with implementation.
Arguments For and Against Public Housing Homeownership
Advocates of privatization of public housing often cite an array of potential outcomes in
promoting and implementing low-income homeownership policies: greater economic
efficiency by reducing bureaucracy and its associated costs, development of a sense of
independence and self-reliance among residents, an ability to accumulate equity on the part
of low-income people, and an increased sense of responsibility among low-income people
that will lead to the improvement and stability of neighborhoods. Former HUD Secretary
Jack Kemp, who ushered in HOPE (Homeownership and Opportunity for People
Everywhere) legislation in 1990, has been a walking source of privatization ideology since
1984, when he claimed:
Homeownership would create pride, improve ghetto
neighborhoods, enhance independence, and encourage stable and
intact families... Giving away housing without requiring any stake
by the tenant would defeat our purpose of promoting independence
and pride among tenants... Our bill [the Kemp-Symms "Urban
Homestead Act" of 1984] gives deserving tenants new reasons to
aspire, work, and save for a home just as middle-income and
working Americans must scrimp and save... Homeownership also
encourages stable and intact families, creates a longer outlook on
life and the future, and gives the poor new reasons to work and
save. It promises to enhance community spirit, create pride of
ownership, and provide greater stability of neighborhoods" (quoted
in Silver et al., 1985, p. 215).
Similarly, Kemp's forward to a 1990 HUD publication describing homeownership
opportunities for low-income residents claims that "low-income people can become
property owners, property managers, producers and job holders if only the barriers
blocking the exercise of their innate talents and abilities are removed" (HUD, 1990, p.ii).
Finally, a 1989 internal HUD memo to Kemp underscores the agency's interest in
privatization:
The American Dream is to own a home. The strength of the
country is that we are not a nation of landless peasants, but a nation
of homeowners. The man on the street needs a simple concept to
grasp onto, and it should not be "reform." It should be "home."
Every initiative will be designed to enhance the possibility of
homeownership, even the rental assistance programs (quoted in
Twentieth Century Fund, 1991, p. 26).
Clearly, these sentiments betray an attempt on the part of policy-makers to make the
institution of public housing more compatible with a dominant cultural ideology that
stresses individual effort and reduced government services. These ideological pitches
deserve closer examination to determine how their authors see public housing as an
anomaly to the market-based housing delivery system and, consequently, why
homeownership is seen as their method of choice to transform its untenable position.
Below, I highlight the intended goals of each argument and discuss its shortcomings.
Assimilation: Privatization advocates believe that a transfer of homeownership
rights to low-income public housing residents will reduce stigmatization by
bringing them into the cultural mainstream. Their emphasis on "empowering"
people via homeownership calls to mind Perin's comment that "the American ideal
of homeownership is equally the ideal of perfected citizenship" (Perin, 1977, p.
72). Privatization schemes provide a mechanism for finding residents a place
within the market system, for forcing assimilation so that they are no longer
viewed as a permanent problem but as a permanent asset. It is as if the federal
government is saying, "We know what works -- homeownership works -- and it
will work for you," the implicit assumption being that social policy cannot find a
way to accommodate public housing so public housing must find a way to
accommodate existing policy and ideology. Seen this way, privatization is a
cosmetic solution, one that ignores underlying structural problems (such as race,
class or gender).
Long-term security: Privatization is expected to provide long-term security for low-
income residents by ensuring a permanent place of residence. While ostensibly
encouraging security, public housing homeownership may actually produce long-term debt
for residents that simultaneously reduces government spending and ensures certainty and
security in the housing and financial intermediary markets. By creating a commodity out
of a structure that previously had no value in a speculative market, privatization schemes
merely transfer the instrument of dependency from the federal government to private
enterprise. Just as homeownership for high and moderate-income residents has been
criticized by some analysts for limiting mobility and increasing indebtedness,
homeownership for public housing residents provides long-term caretakers for previously
public property. In a thwarted sense, then, public housing homeownership can be seen as
an extension of an existing housing policy designed to ensure long-term market security.
Capital Accumulation: Kemp's claim that "independence" will ensue if "barriers" are
removed is notably vague and, as such, can be read two ways. First, it implies that
provision of an asset alone will transform low-income residents' lives to make them more
financially competitive. To provide an analogy, this is like giving $1,000 to someone who
has never gambled before and telling him to bet against professional gamblers and
seasoned dealers experienced in the trade; the odds are not in his favor. In addition,
Kemp's assertion implies that the unit sold will be an appreciating asset, a questionable
claim given that value is determined in part by surrounding neighborhood conditions as
well as siting conditions.
More importantly, provision alone does not address why someone may be living in public
housing in the first place. Privatization advocates treat the difficulties faced by public
housing residents as housing problems rather than as problems of income generation and
distribution. If, for example, the resident does not have a job because he lacks proper
education or training, how can he provide necessary maintenance and/or financing funds?
While one answer may be that he cannot so long as these needs are ignored, another
answer may lie in the second interpretation of Kemp's contention, that is, that personal
productivity on the part of public housing tenants will be realized if barriers are removed.
Social Independence: The term "barriers" can imply an inability to accumulate assets (as
in the example above), assigning at least some blame to the existing political and economic
system, or it can suggest social dependency, finding fault with the individual himself. Seen
this latter way, removal of barriers means removal of public assistance which, according to
many privatization advocates, serves as a disincentive to work and save. The notion that
public assistance, in the form of financial aid or subsidized housing, somehow prevents
people from taking individual action to better their lives, again exposes the tension many
conservative policy-makers feel between private responsibility and public intervention. In
this case, however, the issue for them is not so much whether government should
intervene, but that when government does intervene, the results are not desirable --
namely, that it creates long-term, costly dependency and loss of productivity. The desire
to remove the barrier of dependency, therefore, can be interpreted as the desire to reduce
government assistance and generate personal motivation. For privatization advocates, the
very act of ownership will inspire personal action and accountability. Again, this ignores
deeper problems associated with a lack of income.
Neighborhood Stability: The claim that ownership will promote neighborhood stability
by giving residents a stake in their community implies, conversely, that renters lack the
incentive to be good neighbors and, in turn, that a community of renters is an unstable
one. In criticizing renters, privatization advocates uphold the revered status of the owned
home as the key to creating desirable living environments: homeownership is a goal to
which every renter aspires. While this ignores the reality that many people live
comfortably and happily as renters, it does provide further evidence that a central goal of
housing policy is to create a nation of homeowners.
All of these assumptions are in keeping with a conservative ideology that favors personal
responsibility and is wary of public support. Using these ideological premises to promote
privatization of public housing, advocates can ignore why the need for public housing still
exists. Instead, they place the burden of the responsibility for personal and neighborhood
salvation on the residents themselves. A repeated emphasis on the individual autonomy
and psychological benefits associated with homeownership reveals a desire to decrease
government responsibility and associated financial expenditures, all in the name of
encouraging self-help.
Criticism of self-help policies, however, is widespread. While some worry that the costs
associated with such programs may be prohibitively high, others "worry that self-help
diverts political attention from the massive scope of the low-income housing problem and
may play into the hands of fiscal conservatives who wish to unload government's
obligations onto the poor" (Silver, 1990, p. 127). In the case of public housing
homeownership, for example, many analysts worry that privatization schemes aimed at
reducing existing public housing stock with no provision to construct new units will
merely exacerbate low-income housing problems. A review of past public housing
homeownership programs reveals that these are legitimate concerns.
Implementation Experiences
Over time, the federal response to privatization proposals has fluctuated, from outright
dismissal (in the early 1960s) to preliminary, cautious acceptance (the 1970s and early
1980s) to full-fledged support (the late 1980s and early 1990s). After decades of overt
attempts to promote homeownership among high and moderate-income populations, these
programs represent clear attempts on the part of the federal government to extend
homeownership opportunities to low-income residents. Implementation efforts have had
varied results, causing some policy-makers and critics to reconsider the efficacy of such
programs. Active privatization of public housing began in the late 1960s and has had,
over time, mixed results. 14 Some strategies have been affected by a lack of interest,
14The British experience with privatizing public housing deserves brief comparison. During the 1980s,
under the conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, over one million council housing units
(considered "public" in the United States) were transferred to private ownership. British and American
policies have been faulted for selling the best stock to higher-income residents. Beyond that, American
critics charge that the British experience has limited applicability to the United States, because 1)
others have been hurt by unforeseen costs. However, before examining some of the
problems, as well as potential benefits, associated with these programs, I turn briefly to
actual implementation efforts -- when such policies were introduced, how widely they
were used, and how long they lasted -- to understand how calls for privatization have
coincided with shifting policy agendas and political needs.
While the idea of privatizing public housing began to receive wide attention in the mid-
1980s under an administration that sought reduced government intervention and social
dependency, it was not a new idea. Even in the 1960s, Charles Abrams, an early housing
reformer, claimed that ownership would reduce the stigmatization associated with living in
public housing projects. Around the same time, the Tydings bill, designed to allow
residents whose incomes increased to purchase their units, was introduced in 1967 but
never received a hearing (Silver et al., 1985, p. 219).
In 1968, as part of the "Great Society" agenda, the Turnkey III program was established
to help public housing residents purchase new single family homes through a lease-
purchase agreement. Tenants were allowed to move into homes and build up equity
credits toward purchase after a certain number of years. 15 About 100 PHAs participated
in the program, and over 16,000 units were produced during the program's five-year
history (1968-73), but only 2,932 (less than 18% of those produced) were sold to
residents. Local housing authorities continue to manage the rest (Stegman, 1991, p. 46).
All of the units constructed through this program were single family homes located on
scattered sites.
approximately one-third of the British population lives in public housing, and 2) it does not carry the
same stigma it does in the United States.
15Under the Turnkey III program, residents could purchase their homes when their accumulated rent
payments equaled the unit's development costs or when they secured sufficient (private) mortgage
financing.
Under Nixon, the Turnkey III program was dismantled, but after the moratorium of 1973
was lifted, the administration introduced a new sales program. Section 5(h) of the 1974
Housing Act authorized the sale of public housing units by local housing authorities to
low-income residents in an effort to reduce PHAs' operating costs. This program moved
from creating new homes for purchase to selling existing stock, clearly indicating that the
government was not concerned with preserving long-term affordability. Under Section
5(h), HUD would continue to pay outstanding debt on the units and cover modernization
costs but would not continue to pay operating subsidies or provide purchase financing.
HUD never developed formal guidelines, however, and reviewed (and continues to
review) each proposal on a case-by-case basis (Rohe and Stegman, 1991, p. 8). Since
1974, only ten PHAs have submitted authorization requests, and only 540 units have been
transferred under this legislation. Most of those units sold are single-family homes,
suggesting that those units deemed most desirable are those most closely matching the
dominant image of an ideal home. One reason for such limited participation may have
been the fact that residents were responsible for securing mortgage financing themselves
and often received little counseling about how to do so.
In 1985, the Reagan administration, seeking to test programs that would reduce social
policy expenditures, initiated the Public Housing Homeownership Demonstration (PHHD)
under Section 5(h). In announcing the initiative, the Federal Register's language reveals
the program's underlying assumptions. Phrases that speak of sharing the American goal of
homeownership, breaking the cycle of dependency and creating a stake in the community
appear throughout (Silver, 1990, p. 126). The specific goals listed by HUD were "to 1)
test and document a variety of approaches for assisting and encouraging lower income
public housing residents to purchase their units; and 2) provide information on which to
base regulations for the Section 5(h) Homeownership Program" (HUD, 1990, p. 135).
Under this program, seventeen PHAs were authorized to sell just over 1,300 public
housing units over a 36-month period. Participating PHAs had to ensure 1) that units
slated for sale were in good condition, 2) that residents who chose not to purchase would
not be displaced, 3) that counseling was made available, and 4) that resale restrictions had
to be incorporated in sales agreements to prevent windfall profits for five years (Rohe and
Stegman, 1992, p. 147). No provision for replacement housing was incorporated into the
regulations.
Aside from these guidelines, the PHAs were allowed to select units and tenants and
determine accompanying financing strategies. An evaluation of the program conducted by
Rohe and Stegman in 1990 found that one-half of the units slated for sale were single-
family homes; none were apartments in high-rise buildings. Of those households that
participated, 91% of them had at least one full-time wage earner, as compared to the
average figure for all public housing households, which was 24% at the time of the
evaluation (Ibid., p. 152). Similarly, while the average income for all public housing
residents was $6,539, the average income figure for participants was $16,673 (Ibid.).
These findings suggest that those residents and those units targeted for participation, and
any conclusions based on a review of the program, may not be truly representative of the
larger public housing resident population.
Clearly, the program targeted the most desirable stock and the highest-income residents
for participation. Nonetheless, participants' motivations for involvement closely parallel
those cited by the Fannie Mae survey. When asked to identify reasons for wanting to buy
a home, participants' most frequent responses were, in order, "to have a good financial
investment, to have something to leave their children, and to have something to call their
own" (Stegman, 1991, p.66). These responses suggest that there are psychological as well
as financial reasons underlying their desire to be homeowners.
Although 1,315 units were authorized for sale under the PHHD, only 320, or 25%, were
actually sold. In interviewing those PHAs involved in the program, Rohe and Stegman
found that there were three primary reasons for the limited sales rates: 1) a lack of
commitment to the program, 2) difficulty finding public housing residents who had both
the ability and the desire to participate, and 3) difficulty relocating tenants who chose not
to participate (Rohe and Stegman, 1992, p. 149). Although failure rates have not yet been
calculated for the program, as of August 1989, five of the twelve sales programs had
encountered late payment or delinquency problems (Stegman, 1991, p. 50). Moreover,
"within the first eighteen months of closing on their homes, about 31% of all buyers
indicated that their mortgage payments were causing a strain on their budgets, and 10%
said they were already in arrears on their payments by at least one month" (Ibid.).
Tenant Management Corporations (TMCs) that were excluded from participating in the
PHHD sought Congressional approval for the right to purchase their buildings in the mid-
1980s (Silver, 1990, p. 132). In response, the 1987 Housing and Community
Development Act authorized a different type of public housing sales mechanism through
the Section 21 program, which allows tenants to form resident management corporations
(RMCs) and purchase their buildings after three years of successful self-management. To
be eligible for participation, an RMC must 1) have an elected board of directors, 2) have a
management contract with the local PHA, and 3) be a state-approved, nonprofit
corporation (HUD, 1990, p. 136). Created to reduce centralized management and
revitalize public housing communities, the program's primary goal is to privatize the units
(or remove them from government responsibility), and its secondary goal is to offer
homeownership opportunities.
Some critics contend that the costs associated with resident management are significantly
higher than those of local housing authorities, due to increased training and services that
are necessary for their success. Others argue that while short-term costs may be higher,
long-term costs will be reduced through less reliance on bureaucracy and government
structures. Many seem to agree that tenant management strategies should be implemented
on a case-by-case basis, given that most of the successful RMCs are those led by a few
dynamic leaders (Stegman, 1991 and Heskin, 1991). Indeed, an authorized review of
HUD's Tenant Management Demonstration Program, the precursor to Section 21,
concluded that:
... it would be unwise to mandate tenant management of public
housing -- either requiring it everywhere or prohibiting it
everywhere. Rather, individual housing authorities should be able
to pursue it if they desire, and if they meet certain conditions. HUD
should act as a sympathetic respondent to an interest in tenant
management expressed locally if it has enough resources to help
local housing authorities finance the additional costs involved
(quoted in Stegman, 1991, p. 87).
Finally, the 1990 HOPE (Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere)
legislation marks the most recent attempt to promote public housing homeownership on a
widescale basis. Under the rubric of promoting self-help and empowerment, the HOPE
programs sought to "make the expansion of homeownership opportunities for lower
income families one of the [Bush] Administration's most important goals" (HUD, 1990,
p.1). The HOPE 1 program, which focuses specifically on homeownership for public
housing residents, received a $450 million appropriation for FY 1993 (Vale, 1992c, p. 7).
PHAs interested in participating may apply for planning grants to conduct feasibility
studies for targeted developments as a first step. Next, they may secure implementation
grants, which provide funds for counseling and necessary reconstruction.
As of 1993, though many PHAs have received planning grants and are in the midst of
assessing the feasibility of privatization, none have secured implementation funds. The
future of the HOPE program remains somewhat tenuous, given the change in
Administration and questions surrounding its purported cost-effectiveness. Early
indications from the Clinton administration indicate that it is not as receptive to public
housing homeownership as previous administrations have been. 16
Problems Associated with Public Housing Homeownership Efforts
Some of the specific problems associated with public housing homeownership programs
implemented over the last twenty years are similar to those encountered in the Section 235
program founded in the 1960s to promote homeownership among low-income households
(and described in the previous chapter). The assessment of the Public Housing
Homeownership Demonstration, in particular, suggests that the widespread application of
homeownership opportunities for low-income residents may not be the cost-effective,
beneficial salve it purports to be. Problems that call into question the efficacy of these
policies -- generated from both the assessment as well as reviews of other programs -- fall
under three general categories: 1) tenant selection and preparation, 2) cost-effectiveness,
and 3) long-term policy implications. Each merits brief discussion.
Problems Concerning Tenant Selection and Preparation
1. Tenants often do not receive appropriate counseling about the
responsibilities associated with homeownership. Similarly, they
often need technical and operating assistance, in the form of
training or operating subsidies. Without proper counseling,
16A January 13, 1993 New York Times article covering the confirmation hearings of newly-appointed
HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros quoted him as saying, "I don't think we can outright endorse the concept...
there is a strong place in American public policy for traditional public housing."
residents may be unaware of legal obligations as well as the
maintenance needs of their new homes.
2. Tenants may lack the financial resources necessary for
participation. One PHA, for example, required residents to have
had three years of steady income and a good rent-paying history.
Strict eligibility requirements ignore the reality of who most public
housing tenants are, and create guidelines that cannot be met by a
majority of residents. This suggests either that participation is
intended to be limited to higher-income residents or that the
requirements of homeownership are in fact onerous enough to
warrant reconsideration of program implementation. (Some critics
have suggested that residents who can afford to participate should
be encouraged to purchase homes through programs that target
low-income people but do not involve the sale of public housing
units, thereby protecting existing stock).
3. The need to accommodate non-participants has presented
problems for both PHAs and residents interested in
homeownership. Because some programs require that no tenants
be forcibly displaced, some PHAs have been forced to withdraw
sales proposals, while others have found it difficult to locate
adequate replacement housing for nonparticipants.
4. Tenants, concerned that long-term affordability is not
guaranteed, may be wary of participation. Specifically, they may be
concerned that ongoing maintenance and operating costs, such as
property taxes and insurances or utilities may increase to levels that
are no longer affordable. For these reasons, the PHHD assessment
found that "some qualified buyers preferred the security of being a
public housing tenant, which tied rent payments to a percentage of
income, rather than being a homeowner with fixed housing costs
that might be hard to meet if the owner were to be laid off' (Rohe
and Stegman, 1992, p. 151).
5. The experience of all of these programs suggests that residents
are most interested in purchasing single-family homes. They are
less willing to purchase homes in multi-family projects, suggesting
that there are certain features about single-family homes that are
more desirable.
Problems Surrounding Cost-effectiveness Claims
1. One of the most important questions posed to advocates of
privatization asks whether the benefits associated with public
housing homeownership are worth the costs. The Council of
Large Public Housing Authorities concludes that "homeownership
is generally beyond the reach of low and very low-income
households without deep subsidies; and the provision of very deep
subsidies to a limited number of households, while others continue
to suffer without any housing assistance, is poor public policy"
(quoted in Rohe and Stegman, 1992, p. 153). This recalls previous
problems with the Section .235 program, which required large,
long-term subsidy commitments. Certainly, if a public housing
homeownership program is to be successful, it must have funds for
adequate counseling, replacement units, capital improvement
assistance, and relocating nonparticipants. So long as all public
housing programs have to compete against each other for scarce
resources, homeownership programs may not be the most cost-
effective or desirable option.
2. Similarly, public housing homeownership program funds do not
account for replacement costs. HUD does not supply funds for
construction of replacement units, and because existing units slated
for sale are usually sold at below-market prices, inadequate funding
is generated for new construction. PHAs interested in building
additional units may have to reallocate funds to accommodate large
waiting lists, which may result in reduced funds available for
modernizing deteriorated projects.
3. PHA involvement in these programs has proven to be time-
consuming and costly. PHA staff may lack the experience and
resources necessary to conduct sales procedures or provide
adequate counseling to tenants. The PHHD assessment found that
PHAs often lacked the commitment to privatization programs,
either because of the costs involved or because of shifting personnel
who had varying levels of enthusiasm for the programs. Because
these programs tend to be long-term, they require a sustained
commitment on the part of the residents as well PHA staff.
Increased staff time may require an increased financial commitment
that PHAs are unwilling to make.
4. Homeownership programs do not address the need to increase
incomes for public housing residents. By ignoring the need to
create stable incomes, privatization strategies may need to include
large operating subsidies to meet required costs. Instead, investing
funds in job training may do more to improve incomes (which
would, under current legislation, raise rents and PHAs operating
incomes) than the provision of a home as an asset.
5. PHAs that sell their best housing stock (a drawback in and of
itself) through these programs may unwillingly increase average
per-unit operating expenses. With a decrease in available rental
income, they may find it more difficult to cover maintenance and
operating costs.
Problems with Long-Term Implications
1. Public housing homeownership programs contribute to a
reduction in long-term affordable housing stock. At a time when
waitlists for public housing continue to grow and affordable
housing grows more scarce, the permanent removal of affordable
housing stock seems ill-advised.
2. While homeownership is intended to provide an asset that
accumulates equity for its owners, the ability to actually accrue
equity through these programs is questionable. Given that the
surrounding neighborhood, levels of crime, and siting conditions all
affect a home's value, many of those homes sold through these
programs may not be appreciating assets. In addition, resale
restrictions may limit the value of the unit, thereby preventing it
from being viewed as a full-fledged commodity. Therefore, one
must question the actual intent of the program: is it to provide
equity or to provide public property with long-term caretakers?
Even if the primary goal is to increase equity accumulation
opportunities for low-income residents, how is equity allocation
determined fairly? As the PHHD assessment queried:
Equity issues need to be addressed. Why should some
participants reap substantial financial gain and not others?
Should wealth creation be a goal of low-income
homeownership programs or should most or all of the
equity, not attributable to homeowner payments, be
recaptured and used to provide housing opportunities for
other low-income families? (Rohe and Stegman, 1992, pp.
153-54).
3. One of the overarching goals guiding the development and
implementation of public housing homeownership programs is to
increase neighborhood stability. Homeownership alone cannot
transform troubled neighborhoods. On this point, the PHHD
assessment concluded that "a small island of home owners in a run-
down, largely rental area is not likely to have a dramatic uplifting
effect on the rest of the neighborhood. It is, however, likely to lead
to dissatisfied program participants" (Rohe and Stegman, 1990, p.
250).
4. Similarly, public housing homeownership differs from
conventional homeownership in the sense that buyers are investing
in an entire community, not merely a single-family home. How
responsible should residents be for taking on larger neighborhood
problems? Should units be sold in areas that are particularly
troubled? These kinds of question warrant further consideration, in
light of the fact that most people would rather live in a bad house in
a good neighborhood than vice-versa.
5. There is wide concern that these programs will result in the
removal of the most stable families and the most desirable units
from the existing public housing stock, or "residualization." Care
must be taken to ensure that existing public housing developments
continue to be treated as viable communities and that they are not
further stigmatized. Homeownership programs that deem certain
developments ineligible may reinforce -- for both residents and the
broader community -- the notion that they are housing of the last
resort.
6. Finally, one of the most important long-term implications of
privatization schemes involves the lack of unit replacement. Only
one program requires that every unit that is sold must be replaced
through new construction. Because allocation of funds for new
public housing units has steadily declined in the last twenty years,
existing public housing stock is seen as a precious resource.
Turning units into commodities that are not replaced seriously
threatens the availability of affordable housing. As waitlists for
public housing continue to grow, programs must include an
"equivalent addition" stipulation that safeguards the provision of
public housing.
These implementation problems and raised doubts clearly indicate that public housing
homeownership programs have limited appeal as well as limited applicability. Those
programs that have been most successful are those targeted towards particular populations
and building stock. Given that those units often slated for sale are those that most closely
approximate the ideal owned home, perhaps it makes more sense to sponsor
homeownership programs through the conventional market to preserve as much existing
public housing stock as possible. As one of the authors of the PHHD assessment
forcefully concluded:
If we are to take at face value the Bush administration's goal to
create a million or more new lower-income homeowners by the end
of 1992 without spending a federal dime to create a single new
housing unit, then the goal could only be reached through a massive
sell-off of the existing federally subsidized rental stock. Thus, we
are now able to see the privatization movement for what it really is.
Rather than a means of getting the government out of the way (i.e.,
of promoting greater efficiency, consumer choice, and
independence), the sale of public housing is, instead, a giant step
toward getting the federal government out of the (low-income
housing) business and, as such, should be rejected as bad policy
(Stegman, 1991, p. 126).
The Voice of the Tenants
These last two chapters have concentrated primarily on the criticisms put forth by
academic and political communities of particular housing policies. What is missing from
the debate is the voice of the public housing residents themselves. Analysts, academics,
and policymakers need to know if the residents' aspirations and criticisms are in line with
conventional wisdom. This requires communication and a mechanism for including the
residents in policy debate.
Having established the political and ideological parameters for thinking about
homeownership of public housing, I wish to explore what the tenants themselves -- those
people policy is intended to serve -- can contribute to this debate. In the next chapters, I
concentrate on the West Broadway development, first by presenting a brief history before
turning to residents' views on homeownership to determine the viability of public housing
homeownership programs. The questions to take from the last two chapters are these:
Do housing policies have the tenants' best interests at heart? Is homeownership something
to which public housing residents aspire? Why or why not? What do public housing
tenants think about their communities? In their minds, how successful is public housing?
What can we learn from their feelings? In moving from ideology and speculation to actual
user opinion, I hope to begin to answer these questions.
Chapter 3: West Broadway: Public Housing in Transition
In the previous two chapters, which focused primarily on ideology and housing policy, I
incorporated the thoughts and criticisms of policymakers and scholars to define the
motivations underlying public housing policy development and implementation. In
contrast, in the next two chapters, I concentrate on those people most affected by these
policies: public housing residents. I first trace the history of the West Broadway
development as a reflection of changing housing policy before turning to the residents
themselves. Specifically, in this chapter, I review the development's history and current
conditions to provide a context for a subsequent analysis of current resident opinion on
homeownership.
To place this discussion within the framework of public housing homeownership, I
examine 1) the physical interventions that have taken place to date, which reveal a desire
on the part of designers and housing officials to create a community that resembles a
community of private homes; 2) management strategies and services, which convey a
sense of how daily activities and services have changed over time to accommodate the
residents' needs and promote collective responsibility for service delivery; and 3)
population changes within the development, which illustrate how the residents have shifted
from being a transitional to permanent population. I argue that this shift in population
demographics and tenancy has resulted in heightened tenant consciousness and
participation; this collective participation has greatly affected policy direction and
implementation at the site. I neither distinguish nor discuss each of these categories
separately; rather, I examine West Broadway's history chronologically, including relevant
design, management and demographic information where appropriate.
Because I wish to limit this discussion of West Broadway to its relationship to public
housing homeownership policy, I do not incorporate much general information about the
neighborhood and the development's population in this chapter. Instead, I include basic
demographic and neighborhood information, along with a timeline of the development's
history, in Appendices 3-A and 3-B.
West Broadway: Early History
South Boston's waterfront access established the area as an important shipping and
industrial center early in Boston's history. Originally part of Dorchester, South Boston
was annexed to Boston in 1804, one year before the first bridge connecting the peninsula
to Boston proper was built. While wealthy merchants built houses closer to the water,
housing for industrial workers was originally concentrated in South End's "lower end"
(where West Broadway is located), the area closest to downtown Boston. As industrial
space in the area increased, so too did pollution and traffic. Those who could afford to
move out of South Boston, especially into newly developed areas such as the Back Bay,
did so, leaving behind deteriorating housing structures that were immediately occupied by
low-income, industrial workers.
Planning for the West Broadway development (formerly called "D Street") began in the
late 1930's, in response to the declining physical conditions of South Boston's
neighborhoods. As more land was targeted for industrial use, pollution and heavy traffic
in the area increased, resulting in unsanitary housing conditions. Using public housing
projects to clear slum areas and revitalize blighted areas was actively promoted on a
national scale, following passage of the 1937 Housing Act. The Boston Housing
Authority (BHA), established in 1937 as a Local Housing Authority (LHA) to oversee the
construction and management of public housing as mandated by the Housing Act of 1937,
was explicit in its intentions:
The building of a housing project should not only clear away the greatest
number of sub-standard dwellings possible, but it should help to rehabilitate
the neighborhood by virtue of its plan, with its open spaces, landscaping,
play areas and juxtaposition of its modem buildings. In size, a project
should be sufficient in itself to withstand encroaching blight from all sides.
It should fit into any future plans for the area in which it is set down, and
will be found, in many instances, to be an incentive to owners of
neighboring property to make such needed repairs to their properties to
bring them in line with modem concepts. Housing projects not only
eliminate worn out structures and improve neighborhoods, but can
defmitely stop a downward trend of deterioration and blight" (1941 BHA
document quoted in Lane/Frenchman et. al., 1981a, p. 2-1). (emphasis
added)
Clearly, housing officials were eager to use the construction of a public housing
development to promote desirable behavior within the project and the surrounding area.
Its very presence stood as a powerful symbol of order and, the Authority hoped, promise.
Perhaps the display of tenants working towards homeownership while temporary residents
of public housing would serve as an incentive to save for neighboring residents. Funding
for the West Broadway development was provided by the Massachusetts' Chapter 200
Housing Program, which was originally designed to supply housing for returning war
veterans. The West Broadway development, intended to serve as transitional housing for
veterans waiting to enter the private housing market, was the first and largest structure
funded through this program.
Built by the BHA in 1949 -- the same year that the Housing Act of 1949 was passed -- for
a cost of over $14 million (in 1949 dollars), the development consisted of 27 nearly
identical buildings situated on 27 acres of land. To accommodate the project, eight blocks
of dilapidated frame structures were cleared in a manner that removed buildings but left
intact existing, below-ground utility lines. Instead of replicating traditional city blocks,
however, the development was constructed as one "superblock." Sequential photographs
of the development's construction illustrate how the site was entirely razed (except for a
Lithuaninan Catholic Church and rectory in the center which still stand), and filled with
identical, anonymous, red-brick structures. Using ten different apartment prototypes, 972
apartments were constructed. Each of the 27 buildings contained 3 stairwells of 12 units
each.
While the buildings themselves were built as long-term structures to be, as Gwendolyn
Wright observes, "sturdy and functional, designed to last through the government's sixty-
year mortgage" (Wright, 1981, p. 229), the residents they housed were to be transitional
tenants. Thus, few amenities were provided. Shared common space included a small
green area that fronted West Broadway and small, inner courtyards that contained drying
yards. Figure 3-A, a site plan for the development as it looked before reconstruction,
illustrates how buildings were arranged to allow for shared courtyards. In the early 1970s,
when buildings were separated into distinct villages for management and maintenance
purposes, those residents sharing the same courtyard (two separate buildings) were
grouped together as one village.
The 1950s and 1960s: From A Transitional to Permanent Resident Population
Over the next two decades, West Broadway, again, like many public housing
developments, witnessed a dramatic shift in resident population. Families who could
afford to move away from public housing projects did so, altering the image of public
housing from one of stable, transitional living environments to one of "housing of the last
resort." As lending and underwriting institutions increased the amount of capital available
to first-time homebuyers, increasingly, those moving into public housing units tended to be
Figure 3-A: Site Plan before Redevelopment
poorer residents displaced by urban renewal programs, often underemployed or ineligible
for the mortgage financing necessary to pursue the American "dream" of homeownership.
America's poorest poor were fast becoming the permanent residents of public housing.
Because the federal government made no provision to supply local housing authorities
with operating subsidies, the BHA had to rely on incoming rents to meet its operating and
maintenance needs. In the late 1960s, West Broadway's financial resources declined, due
to an influx of poorer tenants and an associated reduction in available rental income.
Vacancies in the development increased, and physical conditions deteriorated. At the
same time, larger families began to move into these apartments, which led to
overcrowding and undesirable living conditions. In response, the tenants began to meet
regularly with BHA officials to discuss maintenance and service needs. As social
problems and racial tensions began to emerge within the development in the late 1960s,
residents met with BHA officials to discuss the lack of recreational areas and associated
services available to the development's youth population.
One result of these collaborative meetings was the West Broadway Task Force (WBTF),
established in 1969 to increase tenant involvement in management decisions. That same
year, the Multi-Service Center was created to provide a centrally-located center that
would offer activities for the project's youth and elderly populations. As neither on-site
space nor adequate funds were available for new construction, one building, located in the
middle of the development and containing several vacant units, was taken over to
accommodate the center's offices.
These actions suggest that the residents living in West Broadway in the 1960s no longer
saw themselves as temporary tenants. Despite financial shortages, they organized to
garner necessary services and create a more community-oriented living environment.
While they could not control what was happening in the neighborhood at large (industrial
development, increased traffic, and residential segregation), they could organize services
and activities that met their most pressing needs. As a collective bloc, moreover, they had
greater strength to argue for management services that were site-specific.
The 1970s: Wanted: "A Good Place To Live"
Despite the fact that Nixon imposed a moratorium on all federal housing programs in 1973
and reduced housing outlays thereafter, West Broadway managed to secure over $2
million in federal and state funds between 1972 and 1976 for modernization repairs. The
residents were actively involved in obtaining funds and determining their allocation.
Physical improvements included security screens, kitchen renovations, exterior doors and
lighting, and roofing. Nonetheless, a 1976 "Statewide Inspection" estimated that over $9
million would be needed to fully modernize the development (BUO, 1979, p. 11-6). That
same year, the Massachusetts Executive Office of Communities and Development
(EOCD) set aside $50 million for a modernization program to upgrade Chapter 200
housing projects. Of that, $15 million was set aside for "pilot" modernization recipients.
As one EOCD official stated, the goal of the pilot program was to:
... demonstrate the feasibility of several models of LHA, LTO, and DCA
efforts that will involve the intensive management and the capital
improvement necessary to bring the development into compliance with the
state sanitary code, protect the capital investment, improve fiscal
management practices and insure a healthy and safe living environment
(BUO, 1979, p. II-5).
West Broadway, the oldest development constructed under the Chapter 200 program, was
ready to be modernized. Not only had the project received wide attention in 1975 due to
school desegregation, 17 but also, internal management problems at the BHA had led to
worsening physical conditions. A 1977 Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) profile
of South Boston claimed that the West Broadway housing "project is adversely affected
by nearby industrial development and truck traffic and, in turn, its condition adversely
affects any kind of private investment in the area, residential, commercial or industrial"
(BRA, 1977, p. 7). The same report claimed that the West Broadway area had "the
highest rate of housing abandonment, deterioration and vacant lots in South Boston"
(BRA, 1977, p. 6).
Modernization funds from EOCD could be used to revitalize the development and the
surrounding neighborhood. In July of 1978, the EOCD awarded a $6.5 million "pilot"
grant to West Broadway for modernization improvements. Over the next two years, most
of this money was used for new bathrooms and heating and sanitary system repairs.
Another goal of the "pilot" program, however, was to bring together tenants and BHA
officials to map out a physical and social renewal plan for the project. At that time, West
Broadway was serving as a permanent home for hundreds of low-income families and
needed to be "modernized" to accommodate its current population. West Broadway had
been built as temporary housing for smaller families. By the 1970s, however, average
family size had grown, leading to overcrowded living conditions. The BHA contracted
the Boston Urban Observatory (BUO) to assist in this undertaking and to prepare a
"comprehensive plan" for West Broadway.
The Observatory team's report, published in July of 1979, described a living environment
in great need of physical and economic revitalization. Their report detailed that, by 1979,
over 30 units had been lost to "breakthroughs" (the combining of two apartments for
171n 1975, when desegregation was mandated for Boston's schools, South Boston's predominantly white
schools were the first to be integrated. Race riots occurred throughout the area, and incidents at West
Broadway received a fair amount of press attention.
larger families); over 130 units had been "mothballed" (intentionally sealed); nearly 250
apartments were vacant; and 80% of all available open space had been paved (BUO, 1979,
p. II-1). Undifferentiated parking spaces allowed residents to leave their cars in front of
apartment entryways, which resulted in minimal outdoor recreational space. Indeed, more
and more previously landscaped areas were paved, "allowing vehicles to be parked and to
move freely through courtyards and areas of the site where they were never intended. In
the process, fences, drying yards, plants and other amenities were destroyed"
(Lane/Frenchman et. al., 1981a, p. 2-8). Figures 3-B and 3-C illustrate what inner
courtyards looked like prior to redevelopment.
This dramatic decline in maintenance was due in part to internal management problems at
the BHA. As one housing analyst noted:
... poor management by the BHA created grim conditions in many
developments. Disruptive tenants were seldom evicted and repairs went
undone, with employees often doing no work at all. And, because of
political patronage, the housing authority became a deeply entrenched and
isolated haven for the politically faithful" (Bratt, 1985, p. 167).
By 1980, these problems had escalated to a point where the authority was placed in court
receivership. 1 8  Almost immediately, Harry Spence, the court-appointed receiver,
amassed millions of dollars to redevelop the city's deteriorated public housing projects
(Vale, 1992b, p. 2). Under Spence, the BHA conducted a form of "triage," in which
certain projects, most noticeably those in the worst condition, were targeted for complete
revitalization. As Spence stated, "If we didn't do a couple of grand, glittering showcases,
the polity would have been yelling and screaming that we weren't getting anywhere, that
18For a more complete discussion of the Boston Housing Authority's management problems in the late
1970s, see Jon Pynoos' Breaking the Rules: Bureaucracy and Reform in Public Housing. which uses the
BHA as a case study to explore how bureaucratic bodies are vulnerable to corruption and stagnation.
Figure 3-B: Before Redevelopment
Figure 3-C: Before Redevelopment
we should just close down public housing" (quoted in March, 1983, p. 42). The BHA's
intent, then, was to transform projects into publicly-owned living environments that could
be held up as desirable places to live.
In setting forth a redevelopment agenda that could alter the image of West Broadway, the
Observatory team's underlying goal was to create a physical and social environment that
could be considered a "good place to live." The report is explicit in the image it sought to
promote:
While each reader will have a personal image of "a good place to live," the
residents of West Broadway share a realistic goal that defines a good place
by what it is not. "A good place to live" does not have incinerators which
fill the air with smoke and cinders and are hazards for children; nor sewage
which backs up to basements; nor weekend blackouts that leave
refrigerators full of rotten food; nor over-heated apartments that require
opening windows in winter for temperature control. "A good place to live"
does not require family members to eat dinner in turns in under-sized
kitchens, nor mothers to tuck young children into bunk beds in under-sized
bedrooms. It does not require guests to shout outside of locked buildings
when they come to visit; nor elderly residents to navigate crowded
hallways and entrance stoops; nor building residents to fight for a piece of
turf outside that entrance to enjoy the sun. "A good place to live" does not
force auto traffic and playing children to compete for play space. "A good
place to live" does not leave young children to dig beach shovels into
black-topped "green space." Finally, "a good place to live" does not look
like an institution, pock-faced by vacancies, which announces itself to the
world as "housing of the last resort" (BUO, p. V- 1).
By implication, then, to the Observatory Team and the residents of West Broadway, a
"good place to live" looked as much as possible like a private home and placed more
control in residents' hands. A desire to "deinstitutionalize" the development guided the
proposed renewal scheme. The report recommended a three-part redevelopment scheme
that called for, in order, community "survival, stabilization, and completion" (BUO, p. V-
5). The survival component would focus existing resources on correcting physical
deficiencies (including the reclassification of units and consolidation of vacancies); the
stabilization segment would increase community and public amenities (including physical
facilities as well as improved management strategies) to bring about a higher quality-of-life
for the residents; and the completion portion would allow for reconstruction of units to
accommodate different family sizes (BUO, p. V-6-17).
This kind of strategy, which focuses on creating a more desirable physical environment
and a more hospitable social environment, revealed two distinct goals: 1) to provide
households with more autonomy and 2) to preserve avenues for collective action and
control. The authors of the report, working in collaboration with the residents and BHA
staff, seemed principally concerned with creating a community that offered goods and
services that were similar to those found at middle-class developments in a way that
promoted collective responsibility. The "survival, stabilization, and completion"
prescription allowed for both individual control on a household level and community
control on a broader level (which might include advocacy, service provision, etc.). In this
way, the strategy provided services commonly identified with homeowners associations.
This suggests that while the residents had no legal ownership rights or responsibilities,
they were interested in implementing long-term changes that would create a more
desirable living environment.
The Observatory team estimated rehabilitation costs to be $17.6 million (in 1979 dollars).
Recognizing that more extensive reconstruction work was necessary to revitalize the
development, the Massachusetts State Legislature awarded an additional $20 million in
1980 to fund a comprehensive renewal project. Given this appropriation, BHA staff hired
two urban design firms, Lane/Frenchman and Goody/Clancy to work jointly and oversee
the development of the West Broadway Master Plan.
The 1980s: Redevelopment that Promotes Symbolic Ownership
Creation of the Master Plan was a collaborative process that involved the West Broadway
residents, BHA staff, Massachusetts Department of Community Affairs (DCA) employees,
and the two design firms. The Master Plan prepared in October of 1981 stated:
Our most central concern for the renewal program was to develop a design
which will not perpetuate the types of problems which are associated with
the current site and buildings -- underhousing, excessive numbers of
families sharing inadequate common spaces, relentless repetitiveness of
identical buildings and landscape across a 26 acre site, (Lane/Frenchman et.
al., 198 1b, p. 1-5).
A primary design intent, therefore, was to "destigmatize" the development. Concurring
with the Observatory report, the design team believed that "comprehensive renewal of the
project could not be achieved without correcting serious physical deficiencies inherent in
the original design of buildings and spaces" (EOCD, 1990, p. 73). These flaws included
mechanical systems, undersized apartments, and an undifferentiated site. To destigmatize
West Broadway, then, the site needed to be redesigned to create personalized interior and
exterior living space.
To foster cooperation and instill in the residents a sense of ownership in the development
process, tenants were encouraged to participate in all aspects of planning. Village
populations met to determine unique courtyard layouts, and larger tenant groups met with
designers to develop apartment schemes. In this way, the residents had a direct role in
recreating their physical and social environments.
Redevelopment of West Broadway coincided with reconstruction efforts at two other
large, Boston public housing projects, Commonwealth and Franklin Field. For each of
these sites, the BHA sought to incorporate design schemes that would result in living
environments that approximated, to the extent possible, middle-class developments
(March, 1983, p. 17). The West Broadway Team laid out specific design goals, in both
preliminary studies and the Master Plan, for the physical revitalization of the development
to reduce stigmatization and increase physical amenities. As Mike Jacobs, former
Redevelopment Director for the BHA, noted at the time:
Public housing tenants have a sense that they are different, branded in a
sense. Even though there might be an apartment building next door with as
many code violations as some of our developments, the tenants feel that the
family in private housing is somehow better, even if they have exactly the
same income. We saw no reason to continue stereotyping and typecasting
developments as public housing. One of the goals of the design was to
reintegrate D Street with the rest of South Boston. We didn't see any
reason that someone should have to go by the development and say,
"That's a project" (quoted in March, 1983, p. 31).
Five primary considerations seem to have guided the designers' desire to reintegrate the
development with the neighborhood; these included 1) a reduction in density, 2) clearer
delineation of private and public spaces, 3) increased "ownership" of space through
reduction of public space and clearer assignment of ownership to improve security (such
as private yards and private entrances), 4) improved play areas, and 5) separation of
vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Figure 3-D depicts the proposed (and eventually
implemented) redevelopment site plan.
A reduction in density was sought to decrease the number of people sharing common
space and increase individualized space, and increase apartment size to create a more
livable environment for all residents. To that end, the number of apartments was reduced
from over 900 to 675. Many apartments were enlarged via horizontal and vertical
breakthroughs to accommodate larger families. Some abandoned buildings were
reconverted to Village Centers or to the BHA management office.
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In addition to decreasing physical density, the design team wanted to reduce the
institutional appearance of the development. Thus, pitched roofs were added to all
buildings, and different materials and colors were used to remodel buildings' facades to
create housing structures that more closely matched the surrounding structures. At the
request of the residents, access to roofs was abolished to prevent public congregation and
to eliminate roof access to apartments.
In confronting the problem of undifferentiated space, the designers sought to "assign a use
and a user to every square foot" (Lane/Frenchman et al., 1981b, p. 3-2). In a Kempian
sense, then, the design team believed that ownership of space -- if only in a symbolic sense
-- would lead to an increased sense of responsibility on the part of the tenants for the site
and improved maintenance. As the former Director of Planning for the Cambridge
Housing Authority noted:
The more you can design to encourage the participation of tenants, the
better off you are. This generally means persuading tenants that they
actually control not only their own unit but the space immediately adjacent
outside. The further you can push that boundary, the better off you are,"
(quoted in March, 1983, p. 25).
The designers incorporated space that could be controlled and used by individual residents
to promote a sense of responsibility for its upkeep. In addition, differentiation of space
helped to denote public and private areas. For example, the Village Centers, housed in
previously residential buildings, were remodeled in a way that removed the third floor,
altered entryways, and added a new roof design to be clearly separate from residential
buildings. Some outdoor space was delineated as distinct private yards to provide
residents with a sense of ownership and increase maintenance and use of these spaces. In
addition, 112 apartments were provided with private entrances, which reduced the number
of apartments using shared landings and associated foot traffic.
Play areas were improved according to tenant preferences to provide children (and
parents) with clearly delineated recreational space that was auto-free and within site of
residential units. Inner courtyards, which had been paved over and were used primarily
for drying clothes and parking cars, were reconfigured and relandscaped to provide a
variety of recreational opportunities.
In separating pedestrian and vehicular traffic, the designers sought to reestablish
traditional street patterns that would create eight distinct blocks and improve internal
circulation without increasing unwanted truck traffic. The creation of one central spine
was intended to serve as a visual marker that would guide people through the
development, draw them to central gathering spaces, and provide easy access to project-
wide services.
A review of the Master Plan for the development makes clear the designers' intent to
address issues of amenities, appropriate management, and security through improved
physical conditions. For example, expanded courtyards, which contain clearly defined play
spaces, cookout areas, drying areas, and sitting areas, are accessible only from private rear
entrances and one public pathway; cars are blocked from entry by dumpster enclosures
and simple chains to promote safety. Centralized mailrooms and laundry facilities were
designed to increase security and communication between residents. Finally, the logical
placement of management facilities along the central spine increased their visibility and, in
turn, accessibility.
The Master Plan did not address physical design issues alone. The use of Village Centers
and a central spine that housed resident services was intended to accompany a revised
management strategy for the development that would decentralize services and increase
shared responsibility for the physical and social upkeep of the area. In this way, the West
Broadway Team hoped to capitalize on the idea of collective action and accountability by
institutionalizing information-sharing and maintenance responsibilities. Like the writers of
the 1979 Observatory report, the designers hoped to strike a balance between emphasizing
personal amenity (in the form of enlarged apartments and private yards) and community
responsibility (in the form of shared courtyards and tenant-run services).
One analyst has called the design strategy employed at West Broadway "the architecture
of assimilation and empowerment," one that "represents more than ornamental allusion to
the private-sector mainstream" (Vale, 1992b, pp. 3-4). Through selective imagery, tenant
involvement, and targeted physical renewal, the redevelopment process sought to create a
living environment that would approximate that of a middle class development, in terms of
both physical design and available amenities. Specifically:
In unit layout, in building design and in site considerations, the redesign
team has attempted to move beyond mass housing towards a process and a
vision that seeks to help residents become more assimilated into the
mainstream of American domestic life... While clearly aimed short of the
supposed ideal of the owned home, this attempt to revitalize public housing
begins to deliver a much greater security of tenure and sense of
empowerment, through resident involvement in all phases of the
ameliorative process. It is a recognition that housing problems cannot be
solved simply by constructing more units; these will be of no lasting value
unless a sense of trust is constructed as well (Ibid.).
For this reason, the actual implementation of the redevelopment plan is also worth
exploring, as it underscores the tenants' response to the design team's interest in providing
a visible symbol of physical and social renewal. While the West Broadway Team
recognized that the $20 million set aside for renovation would not meet the development's
full modernization needs, it decided to commence construction with the hope that
additional funding could be secured at a later date. As an internal BHA memo noted:
The Phase 3 Report provides convincing evidence that a $19 million
construction budget spread evenly across the entire site would not begin to
address the numerous physical and design problems of West Broadway.
The inability of the budget to provide adequately sized units, reduce
stairway usage, replace the existing heating system, and create adequate
improvements to the site makes it difficult to justify an investment strategy
which does not sufficiently concentrate resources to increase the potential
for successful revitalization. The Authority thus supports concentrating
available funds into a first construction stage to fully complete
approximately 2/3's of the site. Included within this first phase should be
sufficient funds to insure that remaining households receive improvements
which will respond to health and safety needs as well as other important
concerns expressed by the various Village Panels (Jacobs, Sept. 11, 1981,
p. 3).
A 1990 EOCD document which surveyed the redevelopment schemes of a number of
public housing sites throughout Massachusetts reiterated the West Broadway Team's
decision to commence reconstruction without full funding:
Renovating only one portion of the site to the required level of
improvements would ensure that at least the first half of the site would be a
viable housing resource. Additional funds would be sought for later
phases, a calculated risk that the redevelopment committee considered
worth taking (EOCD, 1990, p. 74).
The designers put forth a plan that called for redevelopment work to begin in the buildings
lining West Broadway, those most visible to the general public. The designers and BHA
officials wanted to pursue a phasing strategy that would generate high visibility and an
associated image of "progress" in order to secure additional financial resources.
Moreover, the image put forth to the public would be one of housing that was more
conventional and more desirable than public housing. The tenants, however, wanted work
to begin in those buildings that were least visible and most in need of repair, those
buildings lining West Seventh Street. They believed that it would be easier to garner
additional funds if those areas most visible remained unrenovated, thereby reinforcing the
need for full completion. Ultimately, the tenants' preference was honored, and
construction of those buildings least visible from West Broadway Road began in August
of 1983.
In addition, the tenants requested that no off-site relocation occur during redevelopment.
Vacant apartments were renovated first as "hotel" apartments that served as temporary
shelter for residents whose apartments were under construction. Phase 1 of the
redevelopment began in 1983 and was completed in 1986. During this time, Villages A
and E were entirely renovated, as were portions of Villages B and F; 285 apartments and
two Village Centers were redeveloped. In addition, an on-site BHA management office
was relocated from the northern end of the development on West Broadway to the
southern end to increase visibility and accessibility by all residents.
After completion of Phase 1, it became apparent that while reducing density was important
for creating a high quality-of-life for West Broadway residents, available residential space
needed to be preserved, given the increasing need for affordable housing units in the area.
Whereas Phase 1 allowed for selective demolition of space, Phases 2 and 3 called for
preservation and reconstruction of all available residential space. Phase 2, which lasted
from 1987 to 1989, involved the rehabilitation of 141 apartments and one Village Center.
An additional 56 apartments were completed in Phase 3, from 1989 to 1991. Changes in
design between the initial and later phases included new canopy and facade design, better
pitched roof replication, and more differentiated play space between villages (Hunt, 1993).
Figures 3-E and 3-F depict renovated parts of the development. Again, the tenants were
actively involved in the implementation of the second and third phases; BHA staff as well
as the design team both believe that the reconstruction process was strengthened through
tenant participation.
Figure 3-E: After Redevelopment
Figure 3-F: After Redevelopment
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The 1990s: Integration And A Hope For Completion
Between 1982 and 1990, the BHA imposed a vacancy write-up freeze on the
development, which meant that no vacated apartments could be let to new residents. This
resulted in a growing number of vacant units, some of which were used as temporary
apartments for residents during reconstruction, and some of which were "mothballed" due
to uninhabitable conditions. In 1990, after the first three redevelopment phases were
substantially completed, the BHA reversed the freeze, noting that the homelessness
problem in Boston made high vacancy rates in public housing projects unjustifiable.
Previously, in 1988, the city of Boston began to enforce anti-discrimination legislation,
which stipulated that public housing units had to be racially integrated to reflect the
existing racial diversity of Boston. At the same time, the waiting list for public housing
units reflected a population that was 80% non-white. Thus, when the freeze was lifted
and units were made available to new renters, the majority of incoming tenants were non-
whites from outside the South Boston area. The non-white population at West Broadway
has increased dramatically since redevelopment, from 2% of all residents in 1988 to 35%
in 1992. The Task Force conducts ongoing integration workshops to address the changes
in the development's racial composition.
In 1993, from a physical standpoint, approximately four/fifths of the site has been
redeveloped. Figure 3-D illustrated which areas remain unrenovated; these include
residences along West Broadway as well as the Multi-Service Center. The "public"
grounds are maintained by the BHA, although several tenants have appropriated
unclaimed space as their own, using it mainly for vegetable and flower gardens. Private
yards are used for a variety of reasons, including storage, places for cookouts, gardening,
and as spaces for creative self-expression (through lawn ornamentation or signage). The
playing field and basketball courts adjacent to the Condon School serve as central
gathering spots for development-wide activities and are widely used in warmer weather.
The West Broadway development has been transformed several times, through active
intervention, such as physical reconstruction as well as what might be considered more
passive transformation, such as shifting neighborhood use patterns or changing
demographics of public housing residents. Throughout its history, the development, as a
"public" entity, has been vulnerable to shifting political priorities, funding resources, and
social legislation. The tenants have responded to these changes by organizing themselves
and taking more active responsibility for identifying and providing needed services. As
noted throughout this chapter, the residents living in West Broadway have had a
demonstrable effect on the implementation of redevelopment strategies, the provision of
services, and the allocation of resources. As they continue to assume more responsibility
for the quality of their living environment, it seems like an appropriate time to examine
their aspirations. Are the residents interested in homeownership? Specifically, are they
interested in owning their current apartments? If so, why? If not, why not? What can
their answers tell policymakers, planners, designers, and housers about the future
directions housing policy should take?
Chapter 4: The Residents' Views on Homeownership
In this chapter, I examine interviews conducted at the West Broadway development to
determine the residents' feelings about homeownership and, in particular, homeownership
of public housing. West Broadway is being used as a case study because, while not
formally targeted for homeownership conversion, its status as a (nearly) redeveloped
project that has received over $30 million in reconstruction work sets it apart as "best
case" public housing. To the extent that it is possible to "control" for physical
reconstruction needs, viewing West Broadway as a case study allows for more thorough
investigation of other social and physical qualities that may contribute to successful or
less-than-successful public housing living environments.
After describing in brief detail the methodology employed in gathering information, I
explore the residents' views and offer preliminary interpretations of the findings. General
conclusions and policy options based on these conclusions are discussed in the next and
final chapter. While the questionnaires used for this study are comprehensive in nature
and address a variety of issues, I concentrate primarily on those questions that relate to
homeownership. In exploring how West Broadway residents feel about homeownership
and the underlying reasons that account for their feelings, I hope to probe the efficacy of
public housing homeownership programs. By analyzing the factors that seem to inform an
interest (or disinterest) in homeownership, I hope to generate some broad conclusions
about how future housing policy can better reflect the needs and desires of public housing
residents.
METHODOLOGY
The surveys used as the basis for this discussion are part of a larger research project
examining redevelopment efforts at three Boston public housing projects. The project,
which began in 1992 under the direction of Professor Lawrence Vale of MIT, evaluates
the impact of physical reconstruction on the social and physical character of the
developments to determine what types of interventions are most successful in revitalizing
public housing. The project seeks to develop answers to the following questions: Is
physical redevelopment sufficient to revitalize public housing communities? What kinds of
physical amenities are most wanted by public housing residents? What is missing from
reconstruction strategies? What do residents think about their living environments, from
both physical and social perspectives? How should -- or can -- housing policy be adapted
to accommodate residents' opinions?
To answer these questions, the evaluation uses resident opinion as the primary unit of
analysis in order to ascertain user views about comprehensive redevelopment strategies.
Many policy analyses use financial costs or numbers of people served as the basis for
examination, often to the exclusion of the users themselves. This project seeks to embrace
the users' contributions. To do this, a questionnaire was developed to probe residents'
thoughts on the redesign efforts, their apartments, the neighborhood, management
strategies, tenant activities, security, privacy, and future aspirations. This last section on
aspirations includes questions on homeownership that serve as the basis for analysis for
this chapter. The questionnaire was designed to include a number of open-ended
questions to provoke original, unbiased thought on the part of the respondent. Each
interview was taped to ensure that residents' full answers could be incorporated into
subsequent analyses. Many of these responses appear verbatim in the sections that follow.
To assure a broad range of resident opinion, sixty interviews (one per household) were to
be conducted at each of the three sites. Sixty households represent nearly 10% of total
households at West Broadway. Instead of MIT researchers conducting the interviews,
residents were chosen to interview their neighbors. There were three primary reasons for
doing so: 1) to reduce the amount of time needed to conduct 60 interviews, 2) to
establish credibility among the residents to be interviewed, and 3) to generate interest in
the evaluation project. Each interview was taped to ensure accuracy and aid in coding.
[For a more complete discussion of methodology and methodological limitations, see
Appendix 4-A].
RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS
From a demographic perspective, a high level of appropriate representation was achieved.
Using 1993 BHA (Boston Housing Authority) data as a reference, Tables 1 through 3
illustrate how survey demographics compare to overall population demographics for race,
source of income and age of head of household variables. [For a complete demographic
description of the development, see Appendix 3-B].
Table 1
Race Population Survey
White 55% 61%
Black 11% 14%
Hispanic 29% 14%
Asian 13% 11%
Other 1% 0%
Table 2
Income Srce Population Survey
Wages 22% 24%
Social Sec. 18% 21%
Govt. Asst. 39% 53%
Other 2%
Table 3
Age of Head
Of Household Population Survey
19-21 2% 2%
22-26 10% 7%
27-61 69% 79%
62-79 17% 10%
80-98 2% 2%
Of the 58 people who were interviewed, 53 were women and 5 were men, which reflects
the high percentage of female-headed households in the development. In addition, of the
47 who reported what kind of apartment they were living in, 38 were living in rehabilitated
apartments and 9 were not. The remaining 11 did not state the condition of their
apartment. (These latter figures may be important in assessing who is interested in
homeownership of West Broadway and whether the condition of an apartment is an
important variable).
RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
Survey results suggest that four primary categories deserve closer examination
residents' needs and desires to gauge the feasibility of public housing homeownership:
homeownership, including the desire to own a home, the reasons underlying a desire
own, and the self-assessed ability to own a home; 2) homeownership of public housing;
privacy and space; and 4) satisfaction with living at West Broadway. After laying out the
response frequencies to various questions, I provide several cross-tabulations to determine
if certain variables -- including length of residence, satisfaction with living at West
Broadway, self-assessed likelihood of owning a home, "ownership" of a private yard, self -
assessed likelihood of moving away from West Broadway, and place of residence (in a
renovated apartment or not) -- are important in influencing a resident's response.
Combined, these glimpses into tenant opinion should generate some hypotheses about why
residents are or are not interested in owning their current apartments.
Homeownership: The questionnaire was designed to first probe residents' general
feelings about homeownership before moving on to specific questions about
homeownership of public housing. Most of the respondents expressed a desire to own a
home, as illustrated below.
Question Yes No May be
Would you ever want to own your own home? 69% (36) 29% (15) 2% (1)
Individual responses reveal that there are psychological and financial reasons underlying
resident interest (or disinterest) in homeownership. Many tenants mention that they would
like to have something to call "mine." Some see it as way to accumulate wealth, while
others see it as an indication of success:
"No, it's too much responsibility -- like taxes."
"Yes, it's the American Dream." (twice)
"Absolutely, I could use it for collateral."
"Yes, everybody would. It's something to call your own."
While the aspiration to own is widespread, the motivations for ownership differ widely.
Many consider homeownership to be a vehicle that would allow them to leave West
Broadway. Others see it as a means to securing more space and privacy:
"Yes, because I can call it my own and I won't have to share it."
"Yes, to get out of here."
"Yes, more privacy, more space, better upbringing for kids."
"I don't have to live around people I don't want to live around."
Based on these responses, the residents seem to associate "homeownership" with
ownership of a single family home, one that provides insulation from other people. (This
desire for a single family home is confirmed by a later question that asks tenants to
describe their ideal home: 60% of those who responded explicitly named "a house" as
their ideal). Moreover, ownership offers more control over one's living environment
because homeowners can choose where they want to live and who they have as their
neighbors. In this way, it offers freedom of movement and freedom of choice. However,
while homeownership is desirable, the residents' self-assessments of an ability to own and
likelihood to move away suggest that it may not be feasible:
Question Likely Unlikely
How likely do you think you are to 30% (17) 70% (39)
ever own your own home?
Do you think you will ever move 30% (16) 70% (37)
away from West Broadway?
Several residents said that they were unlikely to own a home unless they won the lottery.
For these residents, the ability to own a home is closely tied to the availability of financial
resources.
Homeownership of Public Housing: While many residents want to be homeowners, not
nearly as many want to own their apartments at West Broadway, as detailed on the next
page:
Question Yes No
Would you like to be able to own 44% (24) 56% (30)
your current apartment?
Clearly, residents are more ambivalent about owning their current apartments than they
are about owning a home in general. There are at least two possible explanations: 1)
residents have a clear idea of what kind of home they would want to own, and West
Broadway does not fit the image, or 2) residents feel there are certain other aspects of life
at West Broadway that make it a less desirable place to want to own. Those residents not
interested in owning their apartments at West Broadway cited physical and social reasons
for their feelings:
"No, if I'm going to pay money to own an apartment, it won't be here."
"No, the walls are thin... it feels like I'm sharing."
"No, unless they fix this place up."
"No, I couldn't deal with it."
"No, [this is] not in the neighborhood I'd want to own a home."
"No, I'd rather own a home."
"No, because it's not a healthy home."
Again, these answers suggest that when the residents think of homeownership, they have
in mind an image of a free-standing, solely-owned house. On the other hand, some
residents who would like to own their current apartments are not as concerned with spatial
independence. Instead, they see ownership as a way of gaining control and/or enhancing
their financial resources:
"Yes, if I could sell it off to someone - yeah - make that money."
"Yes, it's a chance to own something."
"Yes, it gives me a sense of responsibility."
"Sure would. For the time being I'd like to own it. I'd have more control
over it."
"Yes, because I know the area and the majority of the people."
These responses indicate that the underlying reasons for an interest in homeownership
vary from person to person. For some, familiarity with the neighborhood and the other
residents makes ownership appealing; for others, the promise of financial gain provokes
interest. While the interest is shared, the perceived potential benefits are unique to
individual residents.
Privacy and Space: Two questions intended to elicit opinions about the availability and
desirability of private outdoor space reveal that privacy is important to the residents:
Question Yes No
Is there enough privacy 75% (38) 25% (13)
from your neighbors?
Question Important Not Impt.
How important is it for you to have some 82% (46) 18% (10)
outdoor space you can call your own?
Another indication that private outdoor space is something the residents value is revealed
by responses to a later question. When asked what their ideal home would be, many
residents gave detailed descriptions of houses "in the country" or in suburban locations
that provided lots of open room. Space is important to tenants because it provides room
for children to play and because it reduces interaction with "nosy neighbors." Consider
these responses to the question "If you didn't have to worry about money, what would be
your ideal home?":
"Each house spaced two or three blocks away from each other with cable,
cars and butlers."
"My own home surrounded by a park with a view. Swimming pool, tennis
courts, and a private school next door."
"My own house with my own yard with enough room for everyone."
"In the suburbs. When people got to my house, they'd have to spend the
night."
"Big house, yard, land, own garden, pool, tennis courts, jacuzzi."
Or these responses to the first question "Would you like to own your own home?":
"Yes, more privacy, more space, better upbringing for kids."
"I don't have to live around people I don't want to live around."
And these responses to the question "Would you like to own your apartment here at West
Broadway?" which suggest that private control over areas where residents enter and leave
is important as well :
"No, I don't have a private back entrance. I'd like to own the inside but not
the outside."
"The private entrance is good, makes me think it's mine. I have a yard with
a garden, my grandkid can sit outside."
Responses to questions about use of outdoor space indicate that residents see private
yards and shared courtyards as places to sit, talk with neighbors, have cookouts, watch
children play, dry clothes, and, occasionally, garden. Those with private yards also use
their space for storage, parties, family cookouts, planting flowers and vegetables, and,
finally, seasonal decorating. Most of the residents with private yards make some use of
their space. However, a few residents claim that while they have a yard in theory, in
practice they are unable to use it because too many other residents (or dogs) have access
to it.
Resident Satisfaction: An array of questions was included in the survey to evaluate how
satisfied residents are with living at West Broadway. These questions explored what
tenants liked the most, what they liked the least, what they would miss if they moved, and,
conversely, what they would not miss if they moved. These questions are important in
evaluating resident interest in homeownership because they may help to reveal the reasons
for their interest (as suggested by the cross-tabulations that follow).
Two questions designed to directly measure the level of satisfaction indicate that most
residents are comfortable living at West Broadway:
Question Satisfied 19  Not Satis.
How satisfied are you with living here at 81% (47) 19% (11)
West Broadway?
Question Yes 2 0  No
Would you recommend West Broadway to 84% (49) 16% (9)
one of your friends if s/he were looking for
a place to live?
However, a third, similar question that was asked later during the interview reveals a
different response:
Question Yes No Maybe
If you move again, would you like to live 50% (28) 46% (26) 4% (2)
in another place like this?
This last question was asked at the same time that questions about homeownership
(including "What would be your ideal home?") were asked. Perhaps the level of
satisfaction fell dramatically because the reality of living in West Broadway does not
compare well to the ideal of owning a home. Once the tenants were asked to visualize and
describe their ideal home, returning to West Broadway was less appealing than it had been
before. While residents' answers might have been different if the question had been
included in an earlier section, posing it at a latter point in the interview clearly underscores
their desire for homeownership.
19The questionnaire listed four response categories: "Very Satisfied," "Somewhat Satisfied," "Somewhat
Dissatisfied," and "Very Dissatisfied." For the purposes of this analysis, however, I have collapsed the
first two categories under the heading "Satisfied" and the last two under "Not Satisfied."
20Again, the questionnaire listed four response categories: "Definitely Would," "Probably Would,"
"Probably Would Not," and "Definitely Would Not." For the purpose of this analysis, I have collapsed the
first two categories under the heading "Yes" and the last two under "No."
To ascertain tenant satisfaction in a less direct manner, a number of questions were
included to determine residents' feelings about the physical and social qualities of West
Broadway. To elicit reaction to the physical reconstruction, all residents were asked if
West Broadway looked like public housing. The responses varied:
"No matter what you do it's going to look like public housing."
"I like the townhouse-style apartments. Better outlook to people driving
by. It doesn't look like a stockade."
"It looks like little condos; don't look so much like projects."
"It all looks like public housing -- always a congregation of large number of
people."
"The new parts do not because of the architecture -- private entrances.
People take more pride with grass and flowers. In the past, it was just
concrete and blacktop."
"Not on inside, on outside it does."
Tenants' feelings about the physical aspects of the development alone, however, cannot be
used as a general indicator of satisfaction. To provoke thought about both the redesign
efforts and/or the social character of the area, those residents living in the development for
more than five years were asked if things were better off, worse off, or the same, both in
the development and in the broader neighborhood.
Question Better Worse Same
Do you feel most people at West 74% (25) 24% (8) 2% (1)
Broadway are better off or worse
off than they were before the
redevelopment began? Or are
things about the same?
What about people living in 36% (10) 28% (8) 36% (10)
neighborhoods near here? Are
most of them better off or worse
off than they were ten years ago?
Or are things about the same?
Clearly, long-term residents believe that the trajectory of change within the development
has been more positive than that in the surrounding area. This may be due physical
changes or to social and/or service factors that are not available to other area residents.
Many residents cite the physical changes as the element that has made things better within
the West Broadway development:
"It's much nicer to live around here -- it's clean and reflects the attitude of
the people."
"Better off because the attitude towards newly developed apartments is
better. They maintain it better."
"Better off; looking around the development, everyone seems to be taking
care of hallways and grounds, which they never did before."
"Outside is better looking. Design of where you live makes others
acknowledge the change that came about."
While some residents feel that redevelopment has had a positive effect on the surrounding
neighborhood, this is not a universally-felt sentiment, as evidenced by these differing
views:
"The same because it's still industrial."
"Better off, property owners are making their places look better because
the development looks better.''
To determine what residents would state explicitly as something they liked at West
Broadway, they were asked what they would miss most if they moved away. Several
tenants gave multiple answers. 82% (42) of the residents who responded named other
people -- friends, neighbors or family -- as something they would miss, followed by the
neighborhood (6%), management (2%), and convenience (2%). On the other hand, when
asked what they would be most pleased about leaving behind, 21% (8) of those who
responded mentioned "nothing," followed by people (16%), racism (13%), drugs (11%),
and kids (8%). For some, then, the people living at West Broadway are a clear asset; for
others, they are not.
Another way to examine resident satisfaction is to determine what residents see as
problems. Two questions explicitly probe residents' feelings about perceived problems:
"What do you like least about living here?" and "All communities have problems. What
do you feel are the three most common and most serious problems at West Broadway?"
Again, both questions elicited multiple responses. However, each question, while asked in
different sections, provoked nearly identical answers. For each, the top three problems
reported were 1) drugs, 2) racial tension, and 3) gangs. 78% (32) of those who responded
to the second question about problems named drugs as one of the most common problems
at West Broadway; 49% (20) named racial tensions, and 24% (10) cited gangs. In another
question that asked explicitly about drugs, the response rate was similar:
Question Yes No
Do you feel that drugs are a major 80% (41) 20% (10)
problem at West Broadway?
Given these factors that can contribute to a resident's level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction
with living at West Broadway, cross-tabulations can be used to investigate factors that
may be correlated with an interest in homeownership of public housing. What
combination of factors tends to produce a desire to own? Conversely, what elements tend
to discourage an interest? Are there certain types of residents who are more likely to want
to own their apartments?
EXPLORING CORRELATIONS
There are potentially hundreds of variables that could affect a West Broadway resident's
interest in ownership. These include who one's neighbors are, how noisy one's apartment
is, the location of laundry facilities in relation to one's apartment, and how one feels about
existing management services. For the purpose of this evaluation, however, analysis will
be limited to those factors that have been highlighted above. Specifically, in exploring
correlations between tenant characteristics and an interest in public housing
homeownership, the same indices previously outlined -- the preference for general
homeownership, privacy and space, and satisfaction -- are used to frame individual
questions and corresponding analyses. A question, table, and analysis guide each
correlation. As with the tables above, each analysis lists percentages as well as the actual
number of responses. The numbers vary from one correlation to another due to the fact
that some residents chose not to answer some questions.
Homeownership: Before focusing on homeownership in public housing, it is worth
exploring further the residents' general preference for homeownership. The surveys
suggested that while a wide majority of the residents favored homeownership, a narrow
majority opposed owning their current apartment. The surveys also showed that most
residents did not think it likely that they would ever become homeowners.
Question: Are those residents who believe that they are less likely to own a home more
interested in owning a home than those residents who believe that they are more likely to
own a home?
Table 4 Want To Own A Home:
Yes No (Total)
Likely To Own:
Likely 31% (15) 0% (0) 31% (15)
Unlikely 41% (20) 28% (14) 69% (34)
(Total) 72% (35) 28% (14) 1 100% (49)
Analysis: Many residents have the desire to own a home, even if they believe that they do
not have the ability to do so. In fact, those tenants who believe themselves less likely to
own are more interested in homeownership; nearly 60% (20/34) of those residents who
think themselves unlikely to own want to own. All residents who believe themselves likely
to own want to own.
Homeownership of Public Housing: For each of the following analyses, the desire to
own an apartment at West Broadway is treated as the dependent variable; this is done to
allow for easier comparisons across variables. To begin, how different might the results
be from Table 4 if the analysis substituted a West Broadway apartment for a home?
Question: Are those residents who believe that they are less likely to own a home more
interested in owning their current apartments than those who believe that they are more
likely to own a home?
Table 5 Want To Own WB Apt:
Yes No (Total)
Likely To Own:
Likely 11% (5) 24%(11) 35% (16)
Unlikely 35% (16) 30% (14) 65% (30)
(Total) 46% (21) 54% (25) 100% (46)
Analysis: Again, those residents who believe themselves to be less likely to own a home
are more interested in owning their apartments. At the same time, however, an almost
equal number of residents who feel they are not likely to own do not want to own their
current apartments. While a majority of the residents who feel they are not likely to ever
own their own home are interested in owning their current apartment (16/30 or 53%), this
table also indicates that most of those residents who do believe themselves likely to be
homeowners are not interested in owning their current apartments (11/16 or 69%).
Does the likelihood of moving away from West Broadway affect an interest in
homeownership in a similar way? The survey indicated that a great majority of the
residents (70%) believed that they were unlikely to move away from West Broadway and
that a narrow majority of the residents were opposed to owning their current apartments.
Question: Are those residents who believe that they are less likely to ever move away
from West Broadway more interested in owning their current apartments?
Table 6 Want To Own WB Apt:
Yes No (Total)
Likely To Move:
Likely 8% (4) 22%(11) 30%(15)
Unlikely 36% (18) 34% (17) 70% (35)
(Total) 44% (22) 56% (28) 100% (50)
Analysis: These findings are similar to those revealed by Tables 4 and 5. Those people
who consider themselves less likely to move are more interested in owning. Thus, one
could conclude that those residents who believe that they will be living at West Broadway
for a prolonged period of time are most interested in homeownership (both in general and
specifically at West Broadway). Again, however, they are followed closely by those
residents not likely to move and not interested in owning. Their lack of interest could be
attributable to many factors; perhaps they do not want to take on the responsibilities
associated with owning an apartment or are not interested in owning a West Broadway
apartment (for physical and/or social reasons). It is difficult, if not impossible, to
determine why some residents possess the desire and others do not, even if they all believe
that they are not likely to leave the development. While residents who say they are
unlikely to move are almost evenly divided on the desirability of owning their own
apartment, those who believe they will leave report no interest in owning their apartment
by an almost 3 to 1 ratio (11:4).
Privacy and Space: The redevelopment scheme implemented at West Broadway
emphasized an increase in private outdoor space; many groundfloor apartments were
provided with private yards. However, because reconstruction was only about 80%
completed at the time of the survey, all of the residents who do have private yards (31% in
the survey) live in renovated apartments. In this way, having a private yard can be seen as
a by-product of living in a renovated apartment (although not every renovated apartment
has a yard, only first floor and duplex apartments). Therefore, before analyzing the
relationship between ownership of a yard and a desire to own a West Broadway
apartment, it is worth first investigating whether one's physical surroundings affect a desire
to own. The survey indicated that 81% of those interviewed live in new apartments.
Question: Are those residents who live in renovated apartments more interested in
owning their apartments?
Table 7 Want To Own WB Apt:
Yes No (Total)
Live in New Apt:
Yes 31% (14) 51% (23) 82% (37)
No 5% (2) 13% (6) 18% (8)
(Total) 36% (16) 64% (29) 100% (45)
Analysis: This table suggests that physical redevelopment alone is not enough to generate
interest in homeownership, as evidenced by the majority of the residents who do live in
new apartments and do not want to own (23/37 or 62%). Other factors may be more
important in affecting an interest in ownership. Conversely, there are people (albeit a
small number) who would be interested in owning despite the fact that their apartments
are not renovated. This suggests that, for some, the potential financial, social, and/or
psychological benefits associated with homeownership may outweigh a desire for
modernized living space.
Those residents who have private yards can be seen as a subset of those residents who live
in new apartments. Most of the residents with private yards use them for a variety of
purposes, from storage to sunbathing. Those residents in the renovated parts of the
development who do not have a private yard use shared courtyards for some of the same
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purposes. While recognizing that having a backyard is a function of living in renovated
sections of the development, Table 8 seeks to determine if "ownership" of private yard
space is related to an interest in homeownership.
Question: Are those residents who have a private yard more interested in owning their
apartments?
Table 8 Want To Own WB Apt:
Yes No (Total)
Have Backyard:
Yes 15% (7) 15% (7) 30% (14)
No 21%(10) 49%(23) 70%(33)
(Total) 36% (17) 64% (30) 100% (47)
Analysis: This analysis provides mixed results. First, those residents who do have yards
are equally divided in their interest in ownership. While this finding may be attributable to
purely divided opinion, it may also mean that residents are unable to use their yards as
they would like to, or that existing yards do not provide enough desired space. Second, a
clear majority of those residents who do not have a yard are not interested in owning a
West Broadway apartment (23/33 or 70%). This suggests that having a yard may be
especially important to those residents who do not have a yard currently.
Correlating a private yard with an interest in ownership is one way to measure if the desire
for private outdoor space is related to a desire to own. Another is to measure the general
importance of outdoor space. While only 31% of those residents interviewed have private
yards, the survey indicated that a wide majority of the residents (82%) believe that having
private outdoor space is important.
Question: Are residents for whom private outdoor space is important more interested in
owning their apartments?
Private Outdoor Yes No (Total)
Space Impt:
Yes 38% (19) 44% (22) 82% (41)
No 6% (3) 12% (6) 18% (9)
(Total) 36% (22) 64% (28) 100% (50)
Analysis: A slightly larger percentage of residents for whom private outdoor space is
important do not want to own their current apartments (22/41 or 54%). What is not
possible to determine from these tables is how many of those residents for whom this kind
of space is important and who want to own (19/41 or 46%) are those who have private
yards. Those for whom space is not important who do not want to own outrank those
who want to own by a 2 to 1 ratio (6/9 or 66%).
Overall, these two analyses indicate that the availability of private outdoor space may
affect residents' interest in homeownership. In both cases, the desire for outdoor space is
more strongly articulated than the desire to own. Although Table 9 suggests that the
number of those for whom private space is important and who want to own is almost
equal to the number who do not want to own, Table 8 clearly indicates that those residents
without a yard are less interested in ownership. One possible conclusion, therefore, is that
private outdoor space is necessary to create places that will be more desirable as private
homes.
Satisfaction: The response rates to two questions suggested that a wide majority of the
residents (81%) were satisfied living at West Broadway. Table 10 seeks to determine if
satisfaction alone is enough to generate interest in ownership and, conversely, if
dissatisfaction precludes an interest in ownership.
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Want To Own W B Apt:Table 9
Question: Are those residents who are satisfied living at West Broadway more interested
in owning their apartments than those who are less satisfied?
Table 10 Want To Own WB Apt:
Yes No (Total)
Are Satisfied:
Yes 39% (21) 43% (23) 82% (44)
No 5% (3) 13% (7) 18% (10)
(Total) 44% (24) 56% (30) 100% (54)
Analysis: Although the majority of residents who are satisfied living at West Broadway
are not interested in owning their apartments (23/44 or 52%), an almost equal number of
residents are satisfied and interested in owning (21/44 or 48%). At the same time, a small
percentage of people are interested in owning regardless of level of satisfaction (33% of
those who claim they are not satisfied). Perhaps they are interested in ownership for
equity or legacy purposes, as suggested by resident responses to whether they would like
to own their current apartments.
The fact that there is a high percentage of residents who are satisfied but not interested in
ownership deserves closer examination. There are several possible explanations:
1) the residents are satisfied with their apartments as rental apartments but
not as apartments to own
2) they are comfortable living in West Broadway and see no reason to
change their tenure status
3) they do not want the responsibilities associated with homeownership
4) while they are generally satisfied, there may be particular problems at
West Broadway that serve as a deterrent to an interest in homeownership
Table 10 suggests that despite the fact that satisfaction indices are reasonably high and
that general homeownership is highly valued, something serves as a deterrent to an interest
in public housing homeownership. A great majority of the residents cited drugs as one of
the most common and serious problems at West Broadway. Perhaps the perceived
presence of a drug problem is related to a resident's interest in owning an apartments.
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Question: Are those residents who believe that drugs are a problem more interested in
owning their apartments?
Table 11 Want To Own WB Apt:
Yes No (Total)
Drugs A Problem:
Yes 26% (12) 57% (27) 83% (39)
No 17% (8) 0% (0) 17% (8)
(Total) 36% (20) 64% (27) 100% (47)
Analysis: Clearly, those who believe that drugs are a problem are, as a group, the least
interested in purchasing their apartments (27/39 or 69%). However, while a majority of
the residents mention drugs as a serious problem, only one out of 30 residents who said he
or she did not want to own their current apartment explicitly named drugs as the reason
for not wanting to buy. Thus, while this table suggests that there is a correlation between
the perceived presence of drugs and a lack of interest in ownership, other reasons -- such
as the desire for private outdoor space or the desire to own a single family home -- may be
more influential in discouraging an interest in ownership. At the same time, all of those
residents who believed that drugs were not a problem reported that they wanted to own
their apartments. There are several possible explanations:
1) they really do not believe that drugs are a problem, thus the response
can be taken at face value
2) as a group, these residents may be more timid about acknowledging
problems
3) these residents may be comparing the presence of drugs at West
Broadway to other cultures and/or other cities or neighborhoods they are
more familiar with (seven out of the eight residents who fall into this
category are Hispanic or Asian)
4) they may be more isolated, exposed to fewer social activities, or less
aware of problems across the development
5) they may have been living at the development for a lesser period of time
(the next correlation to be tested)
6) they may have misunderstood the question to be "Are drugs a problem
for you?"
7) in general, foreign-born residents are, as a group, more interested in
purchasing their apartments.
Clearly, there are other factors that affect a desire to own. As mentioned above, these
might include one's neighbors, the level of noise, or proximity to services. While neither
space nor information permits all of these variables to be tested, one final analysis that
explores length of residence at West Broadway and its affect on interest in
homeownership follows.
Question: Are those residents who have lived at West Broadway for more than five years
more interested in owning their apartments than those who have lived at West Broadway
for less than five years?
Table 12 Want To Own WB Apt:
Yes No (Total)
How Long at WB:
More Than 5 Yrs 17% (9) 42% (23) 59% (32)
Less Than 5 Yrs 28%(15) 13% (7) 41%(22)
(Total) 45% (24) 55% (30) 100% (54)
Analysis: While one might think that longevity would increase an interest in
homeownership, this table indicates otherwise. In fact, those who have the longest
relationship with the project -- those who have lived at West Broadway before and after
redevelopment -- are the least interested in purchasing (23/32 or 72%). The newer
residents who moved to West Broadway after redevelopment are the most interested in
ownership. Several reasons may account for these findings:
1) long-term residents are comfortable living in West Broadway, have been
satisfied as renters, and see no need to change their tenure relationship
2) the long-term residents (many of whom are older) do not want the
responsibilities associated with homeownership
3) newer residents are more interested in investing in homeownership and
more willing to take on associated responsibilities
4) newer residents' former living conditions were much worse and West
Broadway is much better housing by comparison
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5) long-term residents are not interested in owning their apartments at
West Broadway because they feel as if the development has changed in
physical and/or social ways (such as the arrival of new tenants from
different backgrounds) that make homeownership less appealing
CONCLUSION
The information generated from the resident surveys at West Broadway provides a deeper
understanding of life at the development than management reports or Task Force updates
can provide. Embedded in responses to open-ended questions are words and thoughts
that expose the residents' aspirations, preferences, and fears. These personal opinions
reveal a broad range of feelings about life at West Broadway. To review, the surveys
indicate that:
* Most West Broadway residents would like to own their own home
* A slight majority of residents are not interested in owning their current
apartment
* Most residents think themselves unlikely to move away from West
Broadway or to own their own home
* Most residents place a high value on private outdoor space
* Most residents are generally satisfied living at West Broadway
* Most residents believe that drugs and racial tension are serious problems
at West Broadway
In addition, correlations that compare variables indicate that certain factors may be related
to an interest in owning a West Broadway apartment. While more elaborate statistical
analysis is required to argue for causality, some general conclusions can be made about the
factors that may promote or hinder public housing homeownership. These are discussed
in the next and final chapter.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
The interview results described in the last chapter generate more questions than clear
conclusions about the feasibility of public housing homeownership. Additionally, the
results demonstrate the necessity for further needs assessments to determine where
homeownership ranks in terms of public housing residents' goals and desired services.
Nonetheless, conclusions gleaned from this specific case can be used to highlight broader
housing issues and dilemmas. I have identified two general conclusions that, when
explored, make clear many of the factors that must be acknowledged when debating the
feasibility and desirability of privatizing public housing.
First, the desire for homeownership is high among public housing residents. This
corroborates studies such as the Fannie Mae National Housing Survey, which claims that
"the value of homeownership is felt most acutely by those who have either not achieved it,
or those for whom it is a greater struggle" (Fannie Mae, 1992, p. 3). However, for public
housing residents, the desire to own public housing is less acute than this general desire to
own. Seen another way, a general desire for homeownership does not necessarily
translate into a desire for public housing homeownership. Similarly, a high level of
satisfaction with living in a particular place does not necessarily translate into an interest in
ownership. The West Broadway resident surveys suggest at least four possible
explanations:
1. While residents have the desire to own, they do not think they have the
ability to own (as evidenced by responses such as "No, I couldn't afford it).
2. While residents have the desire to own, they do not want the
responsibilities associated with homeownership (as evidenced by responses
such as "It's too much responsibility -- like taxes").
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3. While residents have a desire to own, they have an image of a place they
would want to own and West Broadway is not that place (as evidenced by
responses such as "I'd like to live in a big house, big yard, more privacy,
more space").
4. While residents have a desire to own, there are certain features about
public housing environments that reduce an interest in homeownership (as
evidenced by responses such as "No, [I wouldn't want to own this place]
because it's not a healthy home" or "No, the walls are thin... it feels like I'm
sharing").
These distinctions are interesting on two levels. First, each suggests a slightly different
policy response; second, as a group, they represent different ways that public housing
residents can think about homeownership. The first two explanations imply a need to
separate the resident's aspiration to own from the ability to own or the desire to take on
associated responsibilities. The desire to own is not diminished by external factors; rather,
the reasons for a decreased interest in public housing homeownership are due to a
personal assessment of desire and/or ability. Potential policy responses that would address
these concerns include job training, improved lending practices, or increased counseling.
The third reason, which concerns images associated with homeownership, is highly linked
to the mythology and ideology surrounding the single-family owned home. As such, it
calls into question the physical suitability of most public housing as privately-owned
homes. At the same time, however, it lends credibility to policies aimed at improving the
physical quality of public housing environments to reflect what is most desired, such as
private yards, private entrances, and larger rooms.
The fourth explanation, however, implies that there may be physical and/or social factors
that diminish the desire to own. In this scenario (given that a great majority of the
residents said they were generally satisfied with living at the development), public housing
environments are satisfactory as long as the tenure relationship is a rental one, but would
be unsatisfactory if the tenure relationship became one of ownership. Thus, there are
certain features (social and/or physical) that are incompatible with homeownership. Why
is this and what are they?
First, residents see homeownership as more than ownership of an apartment or a physical
structure. Rather, it is seen as a full package, providing shelter, neighborhood amenities,
goods and services. This seems consistent with a Fannie Mae study, which found that "by
an almost three to one margin, Americans believe that living in a good neighborhood is
more important than living in a good house" (Fannie Mae, 1992, p. 4). Because the
purchase of an apartment within a larger community goes beyond the purchase of the
interior of an apartment or a yard or porch, there may be limits to public housing as home-
owned environments. This suggests a need to investigate what factors make
neighborhoods in which public housing projects are located less desirable than others. The
question shifts from "Why don't residents want to own" to "What is it they don't want to
own and why?" If specific answers can be found, then specific changes can be targeted.
The interviews with residents at West Broadway surveys suggest at least three factors that
may affect an interest in public housing homeownership: drugs, racial tension, and physical
factors.
Drugs: As at many big-city public housing projects nationwide, the perceived presence of
drugs was cited as the biggest problem facing the West Broadway community. This seems
in keeping with a NAHRO drug study conducted in 1988 that found that 77% of the
largest PHAs reported drug and alcohol problems. While many have contended that
redesign can reduce drug and crime problems (Oscar Newman et al.), West Broadway
suggests that some problems are resistant to the power of architectural change.
Considering that drug problems did not disappear due to architectural rehabilitation, is it
any more likely that they will disappear because of homeownership? Would residents
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want to "own" a drug problem? When managed by local PHAs, at least they have some
recourse through management rules and evictions. Drugs may reduce homeownership
desirability by threatening security, stigmatizing a neighborhood, and undermining the
impression that public housing projects sit in good neighborhoods.
Racial Tension: The West Broadway experience illustrates the potential effects of rapid
integration, including a high level of racial tension and a sensed lack of a cohesive
community. While other public housing developments may have less racial and ethnic
diversity, as well as less racial and ethnic discontinuity with the surrounding community,
the experience of West Broadway suggests that racial heterogeneity affects their
desirability as home-owned communities. If racial tensions decrease an interest in
homeownership and/or diminish the level of satisfaction with public housing living
environments, what is an appropriate policy response? The interview results underscore
the need to create strategies that preserve strong, existing communities without
compromising fair housing practices.
Physical Factors: There may be physical elements that reduce or enhance the desirability
of public housing projects as living environments and potential homeownership settings.
For example, the West Broadway surveys suggest that private outdoor space is highly
desired by a majority of the residents, suggesting that redevelopment schemes include the
provision of private space. Many residents stated that they would like to have something
to call their own, confirming Rohe and Stegman's conclusions about why low-income
tenants were interested in participating in the PHHD. Redesign at West Broadway sought
to provide residents with symbolic "ownership" of space through private yards and private
entrances. In this way, West Broadway provides residents with certain elements
traditionally associated with homeownership without legal and/or financial responsibility
or a long-term commitment by residents. This is an important step in implementing
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physical changes that approximate amenities associated with single-family homes and
heighten the residents' sense of control over their living environments.
At the same time, however, the West Broadway experience suggests that physical
redevelopment alone is not enough to generate an interest in homeownership.
Redeveloped to improve and increase amenities, and to better integrate itself into the
surrounding neighborhood, the site still looks and feels like public housing to many
residents. The fact that parts of it are still not redeveloped may contribute to the
perception that it is public housing and to a lack of interest in homeownership on the part
of some tenants.
Nevertheless, physical amenities may not be able to compensate for social problems or
conditions. Residents thinking about public housing homeownership do not separate
ownership of interior space from ownership of exterior space; neighborhood problems
become residents' problems. This suggests that physical renewal of public housing
developments must be accompanied by broader neighborhood renewal schemes. If people
would rather live in a good neighborhood than in a good house, how can communities like
West Broadway be transformed into such good neighborhoods that residents would want
to own their apartments regardless of their condition? Future policy directives may have
to accommodate the need for neighborhood control to increase an interest in ownership.
A second general conclusion generated from the West Broadway study concerns resident
opinion about shelter. The interview results indicate that residents have different
expectations and images of desirable living environments and homeownership
opportunities. Some tenants consider a desirable living environment to be one where
friends are located close by; others see it as a place that allows them to "get their act
together." Some see public housing homeownership as a guarantee of long-term security
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and stability; others see it as an opportunity to accumulate equity. Again, this variety of
opinions confirms both the Fannie Mae assessment of what homeownership means to
Americans and Rohe and Stegman's assessment of why low-income residents were
interested in participating in the PHHD. Housing means many things to many people.
At West Broadway, as at many other public housing developments, some residents have
chosen to live in this neighborhood; others have been forced there by the whims of the
waiting list and/or the dictates of racial integration directives. For this reason, residents
will have varying levels of satisfaction with their apartment and the broader neighborhood.
Some may have a greater attachment to a particular area, while others may see their
apartment as a temporary residence.
A related issue concerns residents' differing assessments of a development's strengths and
weaknesses. At West Broadway, for example, "people" was ranked highest as both the
thing that residents would miss the most and the thing they would miss the least if they
moved away. For some, then, residents are a clear asset; for others, they are a problem.
These differences in opinion may be attributable to personality differences, to physical
factors (such as thin walls that inhibit total privacy), or to a lack of desire on the part of
some tenants to live within such close living quarters. This variety of explanations
underscores the diversity of viewpoints that may be found within one housing complex.
What are the implications of these issues for public housing homeownership policies?
How can homeownership strategies best be implemented in multi-family developments
that are high-density and full of people with different expectations and needs? For
example, a recurring problem seen in the PHHD and the Section 235 program was trying
to accommodate non buyers. In several cases, demonstration projects were prevented
from being sold because no clear strategy had been developed for dealing with different
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people with different agendas. How would this dilemma be handled at a place like West
Broadway? Moreover, if some residents are interested in buying their homes as equity and
others are interested for long-term security purposes, what are the implications for long-
term affordability? The West Broadway experience suggests that policymakers will have
to devise appropriate methods for accommodating a variety of needs.
Limitations of Using One Case Study
Because West Broadway is only one public housing development, questions of
generalizability necessarily arise. Can the information generated here be appropriately
applied to other public housing developments and homeownership strategies? Which
conclusions and/or observations are perhaps more generalizable, and which require more
cautious generalization?
First, West Broadway is a unique case in the sense that it represents one case over time.
Long-term residents were able to report on qualitative differences in the physical and
social environments before and after redevelopment. Their opinions confirm certain
aspects of both the current literature and prevailing conventional wisdom surrounding
public housing redesign schemes and homeownership policies.
For example, resident surveys verify that low-income renters would like to be
homeowners, that public housing projects have serious problems, and that physical
renewal of housing is not enough to transform areas in need. In this way, the case study
adds important, confirming data to discussions surrounding homeownership policy, low-
income homeownership opportunities, and public housing privatization.
In addition to affirming and expanding upon existing studies, the West Broadway data
point to new areas that are worthy of further exploration. These include, most notably,
the need to examine and accommodate residents' different perceptions and agendas in
crafting policy, and the need to provide residents with a greater sense of ownership, either
through provision of private space or more direct control of the larger environment. At
West Broadway, for example, those residents more interested in homeownership
opportunities were those who were new to the development and new to the United States.
Policy implications for findings that highlight disparate agendas and needs should be
probed; additional case study research can inform this discussion.
Suggested Future Directions
Originally, I had hoped that the results of the interview process would help to reveal
where homeownership falls along the continuum of public housing residents' needs and
desires. However, neither the structure of this thesis nor that of the survey allows me to
adequately place homeownership within such a continuum as neither calls for the ranking
or prioritizing of homeownership and other services/needs/amenities. It cannot convey a
sense of how desirable homeownership is compared to other things, such as income
enhancement or professional development, or determine why one might be more or less
important. While the 1992 Fannie Mae survey does offer some evidence of how
homeownership as a long-term goal compares to other long-term goals for most
Americans, it does not explore why homeownership ranks higher or lower in comparison,
and does not differentiate by income group.
For this reason, this thesis is necessarily limited in its ability to suggest strategies for policy
development that meet all of the needs of public housing residents. While it can
recommend alternative housing strategies that reflect tenants' preferences, it cannot
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approach tenants' needs from a comprehensive perspective. 21 In this way, this thesis is
merely a first step in generating user opinion; subsequent steps should focus on more
comprehensive needs' assessments in order to create policy that is truly responsive to the
needs of public housing residents. Moreover, this study focused on the desirability of
public housing homeownership; it did not consider tenant preparedness or any kind of cost
analyses. Studies which focus on these variables are needed to establish the broader
feasibility of homeownership policies.
Nonetheless, while the survey results yield no clear sense of priorities, they can be used for
a variety of positive purposes that go beyond information-gathering. They can be used to
assess West Broadway's current services and make recommendations for their
improvement and alteration. On a broader scale, they can help identify conditions in
public housing developments that may need modification before any future intervention --
physical, social, or economic -- will be successful.
Most importantly, the interview results reveal residents' feelings about the place they call
home. I have suggested that the ability to determine appropriate interventions is
dependent upon the incorporation of user opinion; this thesis offers one method for
ascertaining such perspectives. It is my hope that as more people recognize the
importance of including residents in policy debates, housing policy will be crafted to
reflect the true needs and desires of its intended recipients.
21Alternative strategies are not addressed in this thesis. For a complete discussion of current tenure-
neutral housing strategies and community renewal initiatives, see John Emmeus Davis' Toward A Third
Sector Housing Policy (1993).
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Appendix 1-A
Federal Homeownership and Public Housing Policy Timeline
1913 Federal Tax Code allows deduction of mortgage interest and real estate taxes
1931 President's Conference on Homebuilding and Homeownership
1932 Reconstruction Finance Corporation makes loans for low-income housing
construction
Federal Home Loan Bank Board System (FHLBB) established
1933 National Industrial Recovery Act authorizes PWA to construct low-income
housing projects
Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) established
1934 Federal Housing Administration (FHA) established
1937 Wagner-Steagall Act (Housing Act of 1937) authorizes construction of 160,000
units over twelve years
1938 Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) established
1949 Taft-Ellender-Wagner Act (Housing Act of 1949) authorizes construction of
810,000 public housing units
Section 115 provides grants for rehabilitation of low-income housing
1954 Housing Act of 1954 focuses on Urban Renewal (requires "Workable Plan" for
federal outlays)
1961 Housing Act of 1961 authorizes construction of 100,000 units to be built within
three years
1964 Civil Rights Act, Title VI of which bars discrimination in all federally-funded
activities, including housing
Section 312 provides loans for rehabilitation of low-income housing
1965 Housing Act of 1965 establishes Turnkey Program for provision of public housing
units and authorizes construction of 240,000 units to be constructed
over four years
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1968 Housing Act of 1968 establishes Section 235 Homeownership Program and
Turnkey III Program
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) established
Civil Rights Act, Title VIII of which prohibits discrimination in private and public
housing
1969 Brooke Amendment limits tenant contribution to public housing rent to 25% of
income; establishes operating subsidies for LHAs
1970 Experimental Housing Allowance Program (EHAP)
Uniform Relocation Act
1972 Demolition of Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis
1973 Nixon imposes moratorium on all national housing programs
1974 Housing and Community Development Act establishes Section 8, Community
Development Block Grants (CDBG), Housing Assistance Plan (HAP),
Urban Homesteading Demonstration Program (Section 810), and Section
5(h), which authorizes PHAs to sell public housing stock
1978 Modernization Rehabilitation Program
1983 Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act
1985 Public Housing Homeownership Demonstration authorized
1986 Tax Reform Act of 1986 establishes tax credits for development of low-income
housing
1987 Housing and Community Development Act establishes Nehemiah Housing
Opportunity Grants under Title VI and Section 21, which allows sale of
public housing to Resident Management Councils (RMCs)
1990 Housing Act of 1990 authorizes Homeownership and Opportunity for People
Everywhere (HOPE)
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Appendix 3-A
West Broadway Timeline
1949 972 units constructed by the BHA
Development to serve as transitional housing for war veterans
1966 Residents organized themselves to become more involved in maintenance
and management of the development
1969 Resident population totaled 3,500
West Broadway Task Force established to manage Multi-Service Center
1972-76 Over $2 million spent on modernization repairs, including new bathrooms
and heating and sanitary systems
1975 9% vacancy rate
Condon School and BHA Management Office built
Boston Schools Desegregation
1976 Modernization needs estimated to be $9 million
1978-79 Development receives $6.5 million "pilot modernization grant" from EOCD
for new bathrooms and system repairs
Demographics: More than 50% of residents were under the age of 19
76% of households were single-parent households
78% of households were female-headed
83% of households were aid-dependent
12% of adult population was working
Mean family income is $4,800
Boston Urban Observatory prepares "Comprehensive Plan" estimating
redevelopment needs at $17.6 million
1980 Massachusetts State Legislature appropriates $20 million for
comprehensive renewal
BHA placed in receivership
1981-82 Master Plan developed
1983-86 Phase 1 renovation of 285 units, 2 Village Centers, and management office
1986-89 Phase 2 renovation of 141 units, 1 Village Center, and basketball courts
1989-1991 Phase 3 renovation of 56 units
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Rapid desegregation of West Broadway
1992 Demographics: 65% of resident population is white
42% of population is children 18 or under
1993 West Broadway cited in Boston Globe for high number of bias crimes
sources: Redevelopment Handbook, EOCD
Master Plan prepared by Lane/Frenchman and Goody, Clancy & Associates, Inc.
1979 Comprehensive Plan prepared by Boston Urban Observatory
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Appendix 3-B
West Broadway Population Demographics
and Neighborhood Profile
Demographic Shifts
The West Broadway resident population has changed considerably in its forty-five year
history. As noted previously, the development was built to provide temporary housing for
war veterans and their families. In 1969, nearly 3,500 people lived in the development.
By January of 1979, however, population numbers had dramatically decreased. There
were 697 households and 2,003 persons living at West Broadway; over one-third of the
population was children aged 10-19. 72% of all households were female-headed; 83% of
all households were aid-dependent; and 72% of all households reported 1977-1978
incomes of below $5,000 (BUO, 1979, p. 11-4). When the Observatory report was
prepared in 1979, 97% of all West Broadway households were white. According to BHA
management reports, 98% of the population was white in 1988; that number dropped to
65% by 1992. The following tables reflect BHA statistics as of April 1993:
Ethnicity: All Family Members
White 975
Black 201
American Indian 8
Spanish 360
Asian and Pacific 224
Other 5
N/A 1
Total: 1,174
Age: Head of Household
19-21 12
22-26 65
27-61 448
62-79 112
80-98 12
Total 649
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Age: All Family Members
1-3 114
4-8 176
9-18 452
19-21 112
22-26 137
27-61 622
62-79 129
80-98 13
99+ 19
Total 1,174
Family Status: All Family Members
Employed Full Time 178
Employed Part Time 50
College Student F/T 27
Technical/HS 23
Disabled 186
Handicapped 14
Minor 726
At Home 325
Elderly 74
Family 169
Wheelchair User 2
Total 1,174
The Master Plan called for 34, or 5% of all units, to be handicapped accessible. Two
four-bedroom apartments are occupied by residents assigned by the Department of Mental
Retardation (DMR); each unit has full-time DMR supervision.
Management Strategies and Services
The Boston Housing Authority, as the owner of West Broadway, is responsible for the
maintenance and upkeep of the entire development. In 1966, tenants began to organize
themselves to respond to a lack of strong management practices. As noted above, the
tenants formed the West Broadway Task Force and Multi-Service Center in 1969 to
provide additional services to residents; funding for these activities has been, and
continues to be funded primarily through private sources.
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One of the redevelopment goals was to "decentralize" management duties to promote
shared responsibility. Although management duties have not been decentralized to the
point originally intended, residents today are served primarily by two service providers:
the on-site BHA management and maintenance office, and the Multi-Service Center run by
the West Broadway Task Force. The Village Centers, intended to provide "Village
Coordinators" that would have a voice in management decisions, are used primarily for
entertainment and educational (such as ESL classes) purposes. They also house
mailrooms and laundry facilities.
The on-site BHA management team, which consists of two administrators and three
maintenance workers, is primarily responsible for maintaining the physical aspects of the
site -- performing routine maintenance tasks in units and buildings, responding to
emergencies, caring for grounds and public spaces -- as well as managing administrative
tasks, which include selecting tenants, assigning apartments, and handling evictions. BHA
year-end management reports indicate that work orders are responded to in a timely
manner, and that average maintenance costs were compatible to those of other BHA-
owned developments.
The West Broadway Task Force/Multi-Service Center provides a variety of services for
the residents, including youth programs, ESL classes, elderly activities, meetings for
young mothers, potluck suppers, and annual development-wide activities. According to
Task Force staff, approximately two-thirds of West Broadway's youth population
participate in youth activities, and 48 tenants are directly involved in the governance of the
center through participation on the Board of Directors and seven individual committees.
The Task Force also enters into outside contracts for additional youth services, including
City Roots, an alternative high school program. West Broadway has two full-time youth
workers and receives VISTA volunteers who work with some youth. Although they have
offered day-care services in the past, there is no on-site care currently.
The Task Force played a central role in planning for the redevelopment, from providing
input on apartment design to insisting (successfully so) for construction to begin in certain
areas. Over time, the Task Force has organized activities that respond to site-specific and
population-specific problems, from workshops on housing desegregation in the late 1980s
to youth counseling today.
The Neighborhood
Today, the West Broadway development lies within a highly mixed-use area. Located
within the development's grounds are the Condon School (built in 1975, as noted
previously) and a Lithuanian Catholic Church, constructed prior to the housing
development. Immediately surrounding the project are a variety of institutions and
services, including a police station constructed in 1990, a few churches, a homeless shelter
that opened in 1987, a social service center located in a school that was closed in 1991,
and several retail strips. Manufacturing plants, warehouses, parking areas, open lots, and
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rail yards are all within several blocks of the development. West Broadway, lined with
commercial activity, serves as a main artery to Boston, and heavy truck traffic throughout
the area is not uncommon. The Broadway Red Line MBTA station is located two blocks
west of the development; several bus lines also service the area.
Haphazard land use development has left West Broadway as the primary (and essentially
isolated) residential space in South Boston's lower end. Other housing structures in the
area tend to be two and three-story frame houses and brick rowhouses. A 1988 report on
South Boston prepared by the same agency stated that one-quarter of all housing units in
the area were owner-occupied and that another one-quarter of all units were public
housing units (BRA, 1988, p. 3). Two other South Boston public housing projects pre-
date West Broadway: the Mary Ellen McCormack development, built in 1938 with
federal funds and consisting of over 1,000 units, and the Old Colony development, also
constructed with federal funds in 1941, containing nearly 900 units.
The same report used census data to conclude that area "residents have lower levels of
educational attainment, occupational skills and income than the average Bostonian...
Household income is well below the city average and the poverty rate is higher than
average" (BRA, 1988, p.1).
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Appendix 4-A:
Survey Methodology
METHODOLOGY
The surveys used as the basis for this discussion are part of a larger research project
examining redevelopment efforts at three Boston public housing projects. The project,
which began in 1992 under the direction of Professor Lawrence Vale of MIT, evaluates
the impact of physical reconstruction on the social and physical character of the
developments to determine what types of interventions are most successful in revitalizing
public housing. The project seeks to develop answers to the following questions: Is
physical redevelopment sufficient to revitalize public housing communities? What kinds of
physical amenities are most wanted by public housing residents? What is missing from
reconstruction strategies? What do residents think about their living environments, from
both physical and social perspectives? How should -- or can -- housing policy be adapted
to accommodate residents' opinions?
To answer these questions, the evaluation uses resident opinion as the primary unit of
analysis in order to ascertain user views about comprehensive redevelopment strategies.
Many policy analyses use financial costs or numbers of people served as the basis for
examination, often to the exclusion of the users themselves. This project seeks to embrace
the users' contributions. To do this, a questionnaire was developed to probe residents'
thoughts on the redesign efforts, their apartments, the neighborhood, management
strategies, tenant activities, security, privacy, and future aspirations. This last section on
aspirations includes questions on homeownership that serve as the basis for analysis for
this chapter. The questionnaire was designed to include a number of open-ended
questions to provoke original, unbiased thought on the part of the respondent. Each
interview was taped to ensure that residents' full answers could be incorporated into
subsequent analyses.
To assure a broad range of resident opinion, sixty interviews (one per household) were to
be conducted at each site. This represents nearly 10% of total households at West
Broadway. Instead of MIT researchers conducting the interviews, residents were chosen
to do this. There were three primary reasons for doing so: 1) to reduce the amount of
time needed to conduct 60 interviews, 2) to establish credibility among the residents to be
interviewed, and 3) to generate interest in the evaluation project. Each interview was
taped to ensure accuracy and aid in coding.
In August of 1992, after the West Broadway Task Force agreed to become involved in the
project, the Task Force leadership was asked to select five residents who, as a group,
reflected the ethnic composition of the development to conduct a total of sixty interviews.
Three of the interviewers were English-speaking, one was Spanish-speaking, and one
spoke Vietnamese and Chinese. I trained the five residents to conduct one-on-one
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interviews with their neighbors by reviewing the surveys with them, anticipating questions
that might need additional clarification, and encouraging practice interviews on friends or
family members who were not going to be interviewed. Each of the English-speaking
interviewers conducted fifteen interviews; the Spanish-speaking interviewer conducted ten
interviews using a questionnaire that had been translated into Spanish; and the Vietnamese
and Chinese-speaking interviewer conducted six interviews.
The Task Force also was asked to generate a list of names of residents who were heads of
households to be interviewed. It was encouraged to select a group of residents that would
fairly represent the demographic composition of West Broadway in terms of race, age of
respondent, residence location, and length of residence. As an incentive to promote
interest in the survey, each resident (as well as each interviewer) was paid $10 per
interview. In general, the selection method was successful in providing a representative
residential pool.
The interviews were conducted in the fall of 1992. I collected the surveys and transcribed
the interviews to ensure that what was actually said during the interview was accurately
reflected on the questionnaire for future coding purposes. I then performed basic
statistical calculations to determine what, if any, variables appeared to be more significant
than others in influencing resident opinion. Those results are detailed in Chapter 4.
METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS
There are certain limitations to employing this type of methodology. First, enlisting the
help of a Task Force is both an asset and a liability. While claiming support of the Task
Force can establish credibility and legitimate the survey, it can also deter residents from
answering honestly if they believe that certain information will fall into the wrong hands
and/or be used against them. Residents also may be hesitant to share highly personal
information if they believe that the interviewers will share that information with other
residents and neighbors.
In addition, employing five different residents as interviewers does result in a minimal loss
of consistency and control. Each interviewer has her own style, which has two important
consequences: 1) residents' reactions may be influenced by how comfortable they are with
a particular interviewer, and 2) the same question is asked in five unique ways, some of
which may provoke long, detailed answers while others may prompt short, direct
responses. Having one person transcribe and code all sixty interviews compensates for
these inconsistencies, but also means that the surveys are subject to one person's
interpretation (which may, in turn, affect coding).
Likewise, while using tenants to conduct the interviews establishes a level of trust and
familiarity, using interviewers that are knowledgeable (and who presumably have their
own feelings) about the subject matter can result in leading questions and/or prompted
responses. However, asking each interviewer to tape their conversations was done to
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deter editorializing, as interviewers know that they will be heard during transcription. In
fact, in most cases, the interviewers remained unbiased, and the responses seem to reflect
the interviewees' own feelings.
Another methodological limitation involves the selection of interviewees. Entrusting the
Task Force to choose the residents meant that the survey sample could not be random, in
terms of both the method of selection and the actual sample. The tenants selected to be
interviewed have made themselves known to the Task Force, through participation in Task
Force activities and/or services overseen by Task Force members, or as friends. As a
result, those people who were not selected to be interviewed are those least known to the
Task Force and may have a different perspective on life within a public housing
development.
Most of the residents interviewed are women. Interviewing a majority of female residents
was a deliberate choice, given the high percentage of female-headed households in the
development. At the same time, other factors also may have contributed to the
preponderance of female interviewees. Again, these may include who is active in or
known to the Task Force, the times that interviews were conducted, and/or who is more
comfortable and willing to be interviewed and recorded. Gender is an important
consideration as each respondent is seen as a representative of a household, and two
family members, especially of different genders, may have different responses to questions.
Similarly, interviewing heads of households only meant that no children were interviewed.
Given the high number of children living in the development, however, we have devised
alternative ways to incorporate their opinions into the broader research.
Finally, two methodological problems became apparent during coding. First, due to
unfortunate translation inconsistencies, several questions posed to Spanish-speaking
residents could not be coded properly. For this reason, their responses are
underrepresented on the tabulation figures for certain questions. It is difficult to determine
if there would have been a correlation between ethnicity and a particular response.
Second, as participation was voluntary, residents were given the option of not answering
questions which made them uncomfortable. For this reason, the analyses vary in the
number of responses used as data. On average, two or three answers were excluded as
input for each cross-tabulation.
Few methodological strategies are foolproof. In developing appropriate methods,
therefore, researchers must first identify their main objective and proceed in a manner that
can accommodate it in a way that preserves rigor and integrity. Because the production of
resident opinion is the most important goal of this project, the problems associated with
this approach were considered beforehand and deemed acceptable.
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